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CONFLICT AND DISSENT IN CLASS ACTIONS:
A SUGGESTED PERSPECTIVE
Bryant G. Garth *
Class action litigation often promotes the legal and political inter-
ests of those whose interests might not be promoted at all were it not
for the class action device--disadvantaged or deprived groups or even
large segments of the public. Nonetheless, while forming a convenient
construct for facilitating litigation in the public interest, the class often
contains individuals with differing purposes and views. Thus, when
class actions in practice lead to neglect of the perceived interests of
class members, we face a dilemma. The extent to which the class action
device ought to be used to promote civil rights despite the opposition of
various class members remains an unresolved question.' At one level,
the problem of class conflict and dissent2 is narrow and technical. At
* Associate Professor, Indiana University School of Law (Bloomington); B.A. Yale 1972; J.D.
Stanford 1975; Ph.D. (European Doctorate) European University Institute, Florence, 1979.
The author would like to thank Professors Richard Abel, Mauro Cappelletti, Stanley Fickle,
and Stephen Yeazell for their very helpful criticisms and suggestions.
I See infra note 68, which lists examples of treatise writers' views on certification of a class
when some members prefer to leave violations of their rights unremedied. For a useful historical
assessment of the class action and its ambiguous nature, see Yeazell, From Group Litigation to
Class Action Part ,." The Industrialization of Group Litigation, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 514 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Yeazell, Part 1]; Yeazell, From Group Litigation to ClassAction Part II: Inter-
est, Class and Representation, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1067 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Yeazell, Part
I[]. Issues of the representativeness of class actions recently have been raised in Note, Reconsider-
ing Union Class Representation in Title VII Suits, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1627 (1982) (favoring a pre-
sumption that unions are inadequate representatives of members in title VII class actions); Note,
Conflicts in Class Actions andProtection of.Absent Class Members, 91 YALE L.J. 590 (1982) (advo-
cating more communication between class lawyers and class members) [hereinafter cited as YALE
Note, Conflicts]. For an interesting and instructive recent account of policies involved in share-
holder's derivative actions under Rule 23.1 and state analogues, see Coffee & Schwartz, The Sur-
vival ofthe Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and a Proposal for Legislative Reform, 81 COLUM. L.
REV. 261 (1981) (the failure to balance successfully the policy favoring enforcement of laws with
that favoring corporate self-governance accounts in part for the fact that the shareholder suit is
facing extinction).
2 1 have chosen to refer to "conflict and dissent" in this Article for several reasons. First, I am
concerned not only about disagreements that have ripened to the point of "conflict" among class
members or between lawyers and class members. I wish to consider also those disagreements that
can be viewed as class "dissent" but that courts generally have ignored or not seen. Moreover, the
literature on intraclass conflict has tended to focus only on objective, material conflict, and I want
to emphasize my concern with conflicts of views about the lawsuit and perceptions of interest as
well. Hence, I refer to "dissent" in order to encompass the full range of possible disagreements
among class members and lawyers in class action litigation.
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another level, the problem forces consideration of the nature, role, and
legitimacy of the modern class action.
This Article begins by discussing whether class conflict and dissent
in fact present a problem.3 From one perspective, conflict and dissent
simply do not matter; what matters is that the courts enforce the law. If
a problem exists, however, the question remains whether Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure addresses that problem.4 Rule 23, it
will be seen, does indeed direct us to the relevant concerns. While Rule
23 permits class certification without unanimous class consent, it does
not permit class members' attitudes simply to be ignored. The diffi-
culty thus lies in accommodating those attitudes within the structure of
Rule 23. Rule 23 jurisprudence does not provide sufficient guidance.5
Reinterpreting Rule 23 as it applies to conflict and dissent, this
Article promotes a participatory view of class action litigation. It advo-
cates an extension of Professor Yeazell's "town meeting" idea6 by argu-
ing that class dissent ought to be explored and considered at each stage
of the lawsuit.7 Next, it demonstrates that a realistic approach to the
dissent problem promises to enhance the effectiveness as well as the
accountability of class litigation.8 Finally, the Article discusses the le-
gitimacy of the apparent politicalization of courts in the context of class
actions.9 The approach developed here does not depart radically from
that already taken by conscientious courts. Moreover, by making class
actions more responsive and effective, this approach should enhance,
not undermine, their legitimacy.
INTRACLASS CONFLICTS AND CONTROL OF THE
CLASS ACTION DEVICE
It is tempting to evaluate class actions by their substantive results.
That is, if class actions most often lead to results that comport with our
notions of good public policy, we arguably need not worry about occa-
sional conflicts among class members or between lawyers and class
members, even if those conflicts are not satisfactorily resolved. Taking
a balanced view of the class action, we might simply point out that
sometimes its results are contrary to the perceived interests and wishes
of class members. 10 Class actions are institutions of representation, and
3 See infra notes 10-36 and accompanying text.
4 See infra notes 37-58 and accompanying text.
5 See infra notes 59-158 and accompanying text.
6 See YeazeU, Intervention and the Idea of Liigation: Commentary on the LosAngeles School
Case, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 244 (1977).
7 See infra notes 159-214 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 215-21 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 222-30 and accompanying text.
to See Bell Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegrega-
tion Litigation, 85 YALE U. 470 (1976). See also Kirp & Babcock, Judge and Company: Court-
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such institutions never translate perfectly the views of the represented
into reality. Moreover, lawyers are well suited to enforce class rights.
Not only can lawyers recognize those rights, they can also take action
consistent with attaining them.
The foregoing view, however, has only superficial appeal. The
class action is a unique legal device that can be employed to promote
and enforce the rights of large groups of people, especially the disad-
vantaged. It is not surprising that those who are particularly concerned
about the rights of the disadvantaged tend to favor class actions, while
those who are not so concerned tend to oppose class actions. Nonethe-
less, even those who generally favor legal rights enforcement through
the class action need to rethink their position on class conflict and dis-
sent. Such enforcement can do considerable harm to the group it is
intended to benefit. As we increasingly recognize, rights do not come
without costs, even to those in whose interests the rights ostensibly were
created. The thesis of this Article is that decisions which have a great
deal of impact on individuals, such as whether to bring suit to enforce
certain laws, require some measure of accountability to the supposed
beneficiaries. Class action suits currently do not fit within either of the
traditional models of accountability in civil litigation.
The "conflict resolution" and "behavior modification" models
constitute the traditional models of accountability in civil litigation."
Under the conflict resolution model, a lawsuit is a form of property that
the holder of a legal right is free to purchase or not, depending on his
own calculations of the suit's costs and benefits. For example, in the
event of a contract breach an individual may take one of three possible
courses of action: he may sue for a contractual remedy, he may seek a
mutually satisfactory adjustment with the breaching party, or he may
simply ignore the breach. If he brings a lawsuit, it is because he has
determined that the benefits of the suit outweigh its cost. Thus, he has
chosen to vindicate his rights through litigation. According to this
model, litigation is the purely private affair of an autonomous party.' 2
Accountability, therefore, poses no problem in this case.
It is theoretically possible to apply the conflict resolution model to
the class action to resolve the accountability problem. Under this
model, the class action would be merely a means to permit the efficient
joinder of numerous private claims. In order to be class members, indi-
viduals would be required to consent to having their rights vindicated
Appointed Masters, School Desegregation, and Institutional Reform, 32 ALA. L. REV. 313, 392
(1981); Yeazell, Part If, supra note 1, at 1112-15.
11 Scott, Two Models ofthe Civil Process, 27 STAN. L. REV. 937, 937-40 (1975).
12 Black has characterized the reliance on self-interested private individuals to vindicate their
rights as "reactive" mobilization of the law, in contrast to the "proactive" approach suggested in
the "behavior modification" model. Black, The Mobilization ofthe Law, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 125
(1973).
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with the class. In other words, each class member's potential claim
would be viewed as a property right either to be asserted by joining the
class or to be waived by not joining the class. This model is embodied
in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 13 for example, which
requires class members to opt into the class action suit. Class members
who do not opt into the suit cannot be compelled to participate. As will
be discussed later, however, this model cannot be applied to class ac-
tion litigation under Rule 23.14
The second model of the civil process, the behavior modification
model, focuses on the role of litigation in facilitating public enforce-
ment of the law.15 According to this model, society's interest in making
conduct conform to legal norms outweighs the interests of individuals
affected by the illegal conduct. Suits brought by public agencies repre-
sent the behavior modification model. For instance, if the United
States Department of Justice chooses to bring a civil antitrust action,
the views of the victims of the challenged conduct are not determina-
tive.16 Similarly, if the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
desires to bring an action charging an employer with discrimination, it
need not consider the wishes of the employees discriminated against. '7
In other words, if the public agency decides to sue in the interests of
law enforcement, it can proceed without consulting the affected
individuals. 18
At least since Kalven and Rosenfield's 1941 article,' 9 there has
been a tendency to justify private class actions on the basis of their use
in aiding public agencies responsible for enforcing federal rights.20
13 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976 & Supp. 1981). Section 626(b) incorporates the procedural rem-
edies of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976 & Supp. 1981). Section 216(b)
of the Fair Labor Standards Act limits actions to consenting parties. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1976 &
Supp. 1981). See, e.g., Monroe v. United Air Lines, 90 F.R.D. 638 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
14 See infra text accompanying notes 52-55.
15 See supra notes 11 & 12.
16 See Stewart & Sunstein, Public Programs andPrivale Rights, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1193 (1982)
(discussing discretion traditionally given to administrative agencies and the executive branch). No
one has yet suggested that victims can prevent executive or agency enforcement action.
17 General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318 (1979). The Court held that the EEOC need not
comply with the requirements of Rule 23. It noted that "unlike the Rule 23 class representative,
the EEOC is authorized to proceed in a unified action and to obtain the most satisfactory overall
relief even though competing interests are involved and particular groups may appear to be disad-
vantaged." Id. at 331.
18 Analogously, the public prosecutor can enforce the criminal law even if individual victims
would prefer to leave matters alone.
19 Kalven & Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the ClassAction, 8 U. CHi. L. REv. 684
(1941).
20 For an oft-cited Harvard Law Review study of class actions that echoes this theme, see
Developments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1318 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
HARVARD Study]. See also Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1281 (1976); Eisenberg & Yeazell, The Ordinary andExtraordinary in InstitutionalLitigation,
93 HARV. L. REv. 465 (1980); Fiss, Foreword-The Forms ofJstice, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1979);
495
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Kalven and Rosenfield argued that the class action would serve as "a
vehicle for paying lawyers handsomely to be the champions of semi-
public rights."' 21 More recently, Judge Jerome Frank's term, "private
attorney general, '22 has been used in the class action context.
The expanding use of civil rights legislation to bring about social
reform makes private enforcement correspondingly more important.23
Concurrently with the proliferation of civil rights laws,24 standing rules
have been liberalized, 25 rules against attorney advertising26 and solici-
tation27 have been relaxed, and a number of statutes have been passed
allowing the recovery of attorneys' fees by successful plaintiffs. 28 These
Special Project, The Remedial Process in Institutional Reform Litigation, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 784
(1978) [hereinafter cited as COLUMBIA Special Project]. See generally Cappelletti, Vindicating the
Public Interest Through the Courts: A Comparativist's Contribution, 25 BUFFALO L. REV. 643
(1976).
21 Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 19, at 717.
22 Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943). Judge Frank applied the term
to the individual litigant, but realistically the lawyer may be the interested individual behind the
lawsuit. For a discussion of private attorneys general, see Developments in the Law-Conlicts of
Interest in the Legal Profession, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1257, 1457-61 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
HARVARD Developments]. It is interesting to note that at the same time as the development of
private attorneys general is increasing and concern regarding the public interest in law enforce-
ment is growing, greater solicitude for the rights and autonomy of clients in their dealings with
their lawyer is also emerging. See, e.g., Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decision-Making: Informed
Consent and the Legal Profession, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 41 (1979). It is difficult to reconcile these
trends. See id. at 76.
23 See Dawson, Lawyers andInvoluntary Clients in Public Interest Litigation, 88 HARV. L. REV.
849 (1975) ("[p]rivate litigation has come to be used increasingly as an instrument for furthering
broad social and political objectives"). For a critique of this legal "purposivism", see Simon, The
Ideology ofAdvocacy: Procedural Justice andProfessional Ethics, 1978 WIs. L. REV. 29, 63-81. See
also Y. DROR, VENTURES IN POLICY SCIENCES: CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS 181 (1971) ("It]he
growing use of law as an instrument of organized societal direction seems to be one of the charac-
teristics of modern society"). See generally P. NONET & P. SELZNICK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN
TRANSITION (1978); R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY (1976).
24 See Miller, On Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the "Class
Action Problem," 92 HARV. L. REV. 664, 670-71 (1979) (attributing the proliferation of new rights
and class actions to enforce those rights to a succession of laws beginning with the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965). See also Bellow & Kettleson, From Ethics to Politics:
Confronting Scarcity and Fairness in Public Interest Practice, 47 B.U.L. REV. 337, 337-38 (1978)
("[w]e are living in a time when social forces are producing expanded entitlements and lessened
enforcement"). While the expansion of entitlements most likely will slow in the current decade, it
is doubtful that many entitlements can be eliminated at this point.
25 See generally Parker & Stone, Standing and Public Law Remedies, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 771
(1978).
26 Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
27 In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978). See also Woll v. Kelley, 409 Mich. 500, 297 N.W.2d 578
(1980); Matter of Koffer, 51 N.Y.2d 140, 420 N.Y.S.2d 560, 412 N.E.2d 927 (1980).
28 The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976), is the most notable
of these statutes. See generally A. MILLER, ATTORNEYS' FEES IN CLASS ACTIONS (1980). These
statutes, in addition, have been interpreted to eliminate any real concern that losing plaintiffs will
have to pay the defendants' attorneys' fees. See Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S.
412 (1978). For a discussion of the Supreme Court's liberalism in allowing fees, see Note, The
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changes enhance the ability of lawyers to bring enforcement class ac-
tions. Now a private lawyer can, with relative ease, find a client with
only a small stake in the outcome of the lawsuit, enlist the client as a
class representative, file suit on behalf of the class, and win attorneys'
fees from the defendant. The power of the private attorney general
thus approximates that of the public attorney general. 29 The central
role of private class action lawyers in enforcing employment discrimi-
nation legislation, for example, is clear.30
Two arguments justify class actions brought by private attorneys
general against the wishes and interests of class members. The first
argument is that society's interest in law enforcement is simply more
important than the individual's interests. This argument rests on the
notion that, because the Constitution or Congress created rights, those
rights ought to be enforced. The argument is perhaps strongest when
Congress has specifically directed that defendants pay attorneys' fees to
prevailing plaintiffs in civil rights actions. If Congress favors wide-
spread private as well as public enforcement, it arguably does not mat-
ter whether the victims of discrimination would choose to sue.
The second argument is that class actions are necessary to over-
come structural factors that inhibit the enforcement of laws intended to
benefit relatively disadvantaged groups.31 Public agencies are over-
worked and underfunded, and individual beneficiaries are unable to
sue on their own and unlikely to take steps to organize and aggregate
their claims. "Underenforced" laws thus necessitate increased use of
class actions.32 An army of private attorneys general should be enlisted
Scope of the Civil Rights Attorneyr Fee Awards Ac! After Maine v. Thiboutot, Maher v. Gagne,
and Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union, 66 IowA L. REV. 1301 (1981).
29 See generally Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 16 (suggesting ways of determining when pri-
vate enforcement of federal laws should be permitted).
30 See, eg., Rutherglen, Title VII Class Actions, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 688 (1980); Comment, The
Proper Scope of Representation in Title VII Class Actions: A Comment on East Texas Motor
Freight System, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 175 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
HARVARD CIVIL RIGHTS-CIVIL LIBERTIES Comment]; Note, Antidiscrimination Class Actions
Under the FederalfRules of CivilProcedure: The Transformation of Rule 23(b)(2), 88 YALE L.J. 868
(1979).
31 For the classic study of these factors, see Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come out Ahead-
Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'y REV. 95 (1974). See generally Cappel-
letti & Garth, Access to Justice: The Newest Wave in the Worldwide Aovement to Make Rights
Effective, 27 BUFFALO L. REV. 181, 186-96 (1978).
32 According to Senator DeConcini, who opened the Senate hearings on the 1978 class action
bill, "[t]he principle that must underlie our discussion is that we are dealing with federal laws that
have often gone under-enforced for lack of manpower and other resources." Reform of Class
Action Litigation Procedures. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Judicial Machinery of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1978). See 3 H. NEWBERO, CLASS ACTIONS
§ 7340, at 1761 (1977) ("[t]he gap between the demand and supply for legal services is ever widen-
ing"). See generally Tate, Access to Justice, 65 A.B.A. J. 904 (1979).
For a discussion of the role of the ideas of "legal needs" and "underenforcement" in the legal
services movement of the 1960's and 1970's, see B. GARTH, NEIGHBORHOOD LAW FIRMS FOR THE
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in the cause of public enforcement. 33
While not without some force, the preceding arguments in defense
of the system of private attorneys general are unconvincing because the
private attorney general ultimately lacks sufficient political accounta-
bility to warrant possession of this political power. The public attorney
is held accountable through the political process for how he exercises
his discretion to sue.34 Therefore, before filing any civil action, the
public attorney general considers whether the action furthers public
policy enough to warrant the commitment of limited social resources.
He also weighs competing concerns such as the benefits to be gained by
enforcement as against the harmful effects of the action on its supposed
beneficiaries. In contrast, the private attorney general bases his deci-
sion to file an action on such factors as whether he can find a plaintiff
willing to represent the class, whether the plaintiffs can win the lawsuit,
and, if so, whether he can obtain attorneys' fees.35 The private attorney
is not specifically accountable either to the public interest or to the in-
terests and wishes of the class members who are supposed to benefit
from the lawsuit. Political accountability occurs, if at all, only at a very
remote level: if private law enforcement through class actions becomes
sufficiently unpopular, Congress might withdraw the right being sued
upon or the award of legal fees.
As the preceding discussion shows, neither the conflict resolution
model nor the behavior modificaton model of the civil litigation pro-
cess is sufficient for the modem class action. The ideal class action
model accounts for both the views and interests of class members-as
POOR: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN LEGAL AID AND IN THE LEGAL
PROFESSION (1980).
33 Newberg has thus noted the general evolution toward private attorneys general as follows:
"The federal courts of appeals have delivered their verdict: the policies and purposes underlying
fee awards are achieved equally as well whether the litigant is represented by private counsel on
the one hand, or by a private or publicly funded organization on the other." 3 H. NEWBERG,
supra note 32, § 7330h, at 1759 (1977).
34 A public attorney's accountability to society is not only guaranteed through the political
process, but is also rooted in his duty to uphold social institutions:
The government attorney's duty is not to a client but to the set of institutions through which
society is governed and the public interest is pursued. Thus, in choosing a course of action,
the government lawyer must ask himself not only: "How will my behavior affect the per-
formance of my job in government?," but also: "How will my behavior affect the perform-
ance of government in general?" . .. When there is a conflict, however, it is the lawyer's
duty, not just as a lawyer, but also as a public citizen, to choose the path more beneficial to
the latter goal.
HARVARD Developments, supra note 22, at 1415. For a discussion on the means of ensuring that
the public discretion is exercised reasonably, see Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 16, at 1267-89.
35 In a recent survey of federal judges, two-thirds of the judges responding (63 of 84) either
agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that "classes are often formed by attorneys mainly to
increase the eventual fee award." A. MILLER, supra note 28, at 299.
For a discussion of the importance of the threshold decision to sue, see Wexler, Expert and
Lay Particiation in Decision Making, in PARTICIPATION IN POLITICS: NoMos XVI, at 186 (J.
Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1975).
77:492 (1982)
the conflict resolution model does-and the public interest in law en-
forcement-as the behavior modification model does. A model must
be found that makes class action lawyers accountable to class members
but does not impose the limitations of class consent. The key to this
model lies in the manner in which the courts handle intraclass conflicts
and conflicts between lawyers and class members. The model devel-
oped below applies primarily to class actions for injunction brought
under Rule 23(b)(2). 36
RULE 23 AS A FRAMEWORK WITHIN WHICH TO BALANCE THE
INTERESTS OF THE PUBLIC AND THOSE OF CLASS MEMBERS
Two objections to the preceding characterization of the class ac-
tion problem are immediately apparent. First, the problem with lack of
accountability is not limited to class action litigation. One person repre-
sented by a private attorney may seek broad injunctive relief affecting
numerous individuals and the public interest. Any injunction action
challenging employment discrimination, for example, is a class action,
in effect if not in form, that does not take account of the views and
perceived interests of all concerned employees. Arguably, those em-
ployees may as well participate in the lawsuit as class members.37
Thus, the primary cause for concern may be the lack of accountability
of so-called public interest litigation in general,38 rather than the class
action in particular. Second, the ease with which plaintiffs can form an
ad hoc litigating organization to obtain many of the same practical
benefits as a class action may minimize the significance of the account-
ability problem in class actions.
Addressing the second objection first, when organizational law-
suits serve merely to circumvent class action requirements, the concerns
are identical.39 Indeed, Rule 23.2 specifically notes the connection
36 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2):
(b) An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are
satisfied, and in addition:
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applica-
ble to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declara-
tory relief with respect to the class as a whole ....
37 Cf. Federal R. Civ. P. 23 Advisory Committee Note, 39 F.R.D. 98, 102 (1966). The view of
the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is criticized in Note, Due Process
Rights of Absentees in Title VII Class Actions-The Myth of Homogeneity of Interest, 59 B.U.L..
REv. 661 (1979) [hereinafter cited as BOSTON Note].
38 See, e.g., Cahn & Calm, Power to the People or to the Profession-The Public Interest in
Public Interest Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1005 (1979); Note, In Defense of an Embattled Mode of Advo-
cacy: AnAnalysis and Jusiflcation of (ublic Interest Practice, 90 YALE L.J. 1436 (1981) [hereinaf-
ter cited as YALE Note, In Defnse]; Note, The New Public Interest Lawyers, 79 YALE L.J. 1069
(1979) [hereinafter cited as YALE Note, Public Interest].
39 Furthermore, as a practical matter class actions represent a much larger proportion of pub-
lic interest litigation than organizations.
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between class actions and organizational lawsuits.40 Rule 23.2 provides
that the class action doctrine on representation should apply to lawsuits
brought by unincorporated associations. If the ad hoc organization is
really the class, the "leadership" must be adequate in the same sense
that class representatives must be adequate. Moreover, concern about
the level of accountability and responsiveness in organizational law-
suits has been increasing.41
In short, organizational lawsuits are similar enough to class actions
that focusing only on the problems of class actions under Rule 23 is not
an unduly restricted endeavor. Thus, the important question, which is
applicable to both organizational lawsuits and class actions, is why this
discussion of accountability is limited to injunction actions in which the
individuals are aggregated, when the effects of injunction actions on
those individuals are potentially the same whether or not they are
aggregated.
As a practical matter, it often makes a difference to the success of
the suit for injunction whether it proceeds as a class action. The exist-
ence of a class whose interests are clearly represented by the lawsuit
may help substantially to persuade the judge of popular support behind
a particular remedy.42 In some cases, even an assumption of represen-
tativeness may serve the same purpose. Injunction is an equitable rem-
edy, and the balance may tip more towards that relief when it is sought
on behalf of a class certified under Rule 23 than when it is brought on
behalf of an individual.43 One commentator who analyzed environ-
mental litigation concluded, for example, that "[i]n a very practical
40 FED. R. Civ. P. 23.2 (added in 1966 along with revised Rule 23) provides:
An action brought by or against the members of an unincorporated association as a class by
naming certain members as representative parties may be maintained only if it appears that
the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the association
and its members. In the conduct of the action the court may make appropriate orders corre-
sponding with those described in Rule 23(d), and the procedure for dismissal or compromise
of the action shall correspond with that provided in Rule 23(e).
41 Cf. Health Research Group v. Kennedy, 82 F.R.D. 21 (D.D.C. 1979) (denying standing to a
Nader group on the grounds that supporters of the group had no control over the organization).
See generally Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III- Perspectives on the "Case or Contro-
versy" Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REv. 297 (1979); Note, Associational Standing and Due Process
The Needfor an Adequate Representation Scrutiny, 61 B.U.L. REv. 174 (1981).
Organizations present fewer responsiveness problems than do class actions. The organization
ordinarily must obtain support from its purported beneficiaries, and organizations usually have
means for uncovering conflict and resolving it. See, e.g., Zacharias, Standing of Public Interest
Litigating Groups to Sue on Behalf of their Members, 39 U. Prrr. L. REv. 453 (1978). The class
action, in contrast, may more easily proceed on the basis of goals set by a few key individuals or
lawyers. It may be, however, that greater scrutiny of "association actions" also ought to be re-
quired to ensure that associations are in fact representative.
42 The existence of an active litigating organization also may help persuade the judge to grant
an injunction.
43 In Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 437 U.S. 478 (1978), the plaintiff made the
similar argument that denial of class certification should be reviewable in an action for an injunc-
tion because it amounts in effect to a denial of the injunction. While the Court refused to allow
77:492 (1982)
sense, having a class of plaintiffs may well determine the outcome of an
injunctive action where the court must weigh the equities of the oppos-
ing parties in deciding whether to grant the requested relief."44 None-
theless, class certification will not always be important in judicial
consideration of the equities involved. If the remedy sought is absolute
and affects extremely diverse interests--enjoining the building of a
dam, for example-so that the court simply does not know the class
members' reactions to the proposed remedy, certification becomes a
formality that has no impact on court discretion.
In injunction actions in which the relief sought is not so drastic nor
the interests affected so diverse, however, the impact of class certifica-
tion becomes more pronounced. An employment discrimination class
action provides a typical example. First, if the complaint is brought on
behalf of an individual, defendants can settle more easily without
changing their general discriminatory practices. In an individual ac-
tion, the defendant can settle by promoting, paying, or otherwise molli-
fying the plaintiff, while in a class action the defendant can settle only
with court approval.45 Second, the defendant can moot the individual
action by giving the plaintiff what he seeks. A class action, on the other
hand, continues to present a live controversy even if the named repre-
sentatives no longer have claims.46 Third, class actions sometimes re-
sult in broader discovery than individual actions, since discovery
cannot be limited to facts and documents linked to the claims of the
individual plaintiff. In addition, class actions lead to larger attorneys'
fees because they are bigger and more complicated. Therefore, a law-
yer is more likely to agree to represent a class than an individual.47
Furthermore, in an employment discrimination lawsuit, the rem-
edy is more complex than in a suit to stop construction of a dam. The
result in a successful antidiscrimination action often will be a plan to
root out discrimination, involving goals, timetables, seniority rights,
qualifications, and recruitment procedures. 48 The design of such a plan
will differ significantly if the plan addresses the situation of a few indi-
viduals rather than the situation of a class. The court typically will
have considerable discretion in formulating the remedy; the remedy's
the interlocutory appeal, it never questioned the idea that class certification was an important aid
in obtaining broad injunctive relief.
44 Note, The Viability of Class Actions in Environmental Litigation, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 533, 563
(1972). See I H. NEWBERG, supra note 32, § 1010.1; COLUMBIA Special Project, supra note 20, at
876.
45 FED. R. Civ. P. 23. See 3B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 23.80[3] (2d ed. 1948).
46 See, e.g., Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388 (1980); Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v.
Roper, 445 U.S. 236 (1980).
47 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
48 Such an obvious observation is noticeably missing from the advisory committee's discussion
of Rule 23(b)(2). See Federal R. Civ. P. 23 Advisory Committee Note, 3 F.R.D. 98, 102 (1966).
For elaboration and criticism of the Advisory Committee Notes, see BOSTON Note, supra note 37.
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scope and shape inevitably will depend on who is before the court.49
Thus, although an individual may obtain a broad remedy affecting a
number of fellow employees, a class action is more likely to result in a
comprehensive effort to eliminate discrimination.
For the reasons discussed above-first, that judges are more dis-
posed to grant injunctions in class actions than individual actions, and
second, that the existence of a class affects the content of the remedy-
it clearly does matter whether a suit for an injunction is brought on
behalf of one person or on behalf of a class. Moreover, it also matters
which member of the class argues what before the court. This raises
the more general question of whether courts seriously must confront
conflict and dissent in the class. This Article argues that, in making the
decision whether to certify a class, the court must attempt to discover
conflict within the class.
If conflict does exist, the next question is what the effect of that
conflict ought to be on the action. Sometimes conflict may be signifi-
cant enough that the court should prevent the action from proceeding
on behalf of a class. This would deny several advantages to plaintiffs
and their counsel and perhaps affect the court in formulating a remedy,
as discussed earlier.50 Thus, more often than not, the court should al-
low the action to proceed on behalf of a class. Yet, the court should
consider the dissenters' views and interests as the action proceeds.5' If
the court has a full and accurate picture of the class throughout, it can
make the class action lawsuit a much more accountable institution.
The "bland terms of Rule 23, ' ' 52 in fact, compel a search for an
acceptable balance between the public interest in law enforcement and
the private interests and views of class members. The law enforcement
concern most obviously emerges in injunction actions, which are
brought under Rule 23(b)(2). Rule 23(b)(2) class members generally
are unable to opt out of the lawsuit and may be bound even if they
receive no notice of the action.5 3 Thus, under the terms of the Rule,
class actions for injunctions must, at the very least, be allowed to pro-
49 Cf. Black Faculty Ass'n v. San Diego Community College Dist., 664 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir.
1981) (classwide relief could not be ordered in the absence of valid certification of the class).
50 See supra text accompanying notes 48 & 49.
51 For instance, a court can frame a remedy in an injunction proceeding, such as one attacking
employment discrimination, in countless ways. How it frames that remedy should depend on the
views and interests of class members. Knowledge of conflicting opinions among class members
about the appropriate way to modify a promotion requirement, for example, would enable the
court to render the most appropriate and equitable remedy. See infra notes 148-58 & 210-14 and
accompanying text. See also Weinstein, Litigation Seeking Changes in Public Rehavior and Instifu-
tions-Some Views on Particiation, 13 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 23 1, 235 (1980) ("in litigation [seeking
changes in public behavior and institutions], there is brought home to the court the need to protect
present and future interests of diffuse heterogeneous groups with varied concerns and capacities").
52 Yeazell, Part If,,supra note 1, at 1120.
53 See generaly 3B J. MOORE, supra note 45, § 23.72, at 486-87 nn.8-10. The problems of Rule
23(b)(2) actions as discussed here would also apply to actions brought under Rule 23(b)(1). Since
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ceed without the active support of class members. As the Advisory
Committee suggests, although perhaps a bit too sanguinely, Rule
23(b)(2) does encourage such actions as civil rights class actions for in-
junctive relief.54
Rule 23 by its terms also favors class actions for damages, even if
not all members affirmatively support the litigation. As amended in
1966, Rule 23(b)(3) allows actions to proceed on behalf of any class
member who fails to opt in, while prior to that amendment class mem-
bers had to opt out to be bound by judgment.5 5 The focus of Rule
23(b)(3) thus has shifted to encourage law enforcement.
At the same time, however, the interest in allowing class litigation
to proceed is balanced by the requirement of Rule 23 that representa-
tives be "adequate" and "typical".5 6 While those words are vague,5 7
they strongly suggest that the class representatives must, in fact, repre-
sent. If ensuring the enforcement of legal rights were the primary pur-
pose of Rule 23, as some commentators have contended, the
representativeness of the class representatives would not matter 5 8 The
only concern would be whether the class representatives and their
counsel were vigorous and competent.
Thus, while Rule 23 does not require the affirmative consent of all
class members, neither does it allow the views and interests of class
members to be neglected. Both the politico-legal role of the class action
most of these class actions are of the Rule 23(b)(2) variety, this Article has focused the discussion
on them.
54 Federal R. "Civ. P. 23 Advisory Committee Note, 39 F.R.D. 98, 102 (1966).
55 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2). See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974). See also
HARVARD Study, supra note 20, at 1488-89 (criticizing the opt out provisions).
Damages class actions have attracted more attention than injunction actions because of the
huge awards and the sizeable attorneys' fees available in such actions. For an oft-cited article
attacking such litigation, see Simon, ClassAction: Useful Toolor Engine of Destruction, 55 F.R.D.
373 (1972).
The previous rule for "spurious" class actions is discussed at 3B J. MOORE, supra note 45,
app. § 23.10. Miller, supra note 24, at 667-76, rightly points out that Rule 23 is not "responsible for
the great increase in federal civil litigation."
56 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a). See generally Degnan, Forward- Adequacy ofRepresentation in Class
4ctions, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 705 (1972); Note, The Importance of Being Adequate: Due Process
Requirements in Class Actions Under Federal Rule 23, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1217 (1975); HARVARD
Study, supra note 20, at 1471-98. Applications of the rule are provided in 3B J. MOORE, supra
note 45, § 23.07; 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1764-69
(1972). "Typicality", it should be noted, is required by Rule 23(a)(3), but the modem trend is to
consider typicality along with the adequacy of representation required by Rule 23(a)(4). 3B J.
MOORE, supra note 45, § 23.06-2.
57 For a suggested approach in determining adequacy and typicality, see infra text accompa-
nying notes 165-200.
58 See Comment, Recent Developments in Class Action Mootness and Attorney Fees Doctrine:
Giving Recognition to the Enforcement Rationale ofClass Actions, 28 WAYNE L. REV. 343 (1981).
See also infra notes 99-104 and accompanying text. Ensuring the enforcement of legal rights, of
course, is the province of the public attorney general. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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today and the language of Rule 23 necessitate an approach to class
conflicts that is sensitive to the public interest in law enforcement with-
out ignoring the concerns of the class members.
DOCTRINAL APPROACHES TO CONFLICT AND DISSENT
IN CLASS ACTIONS
The court may confront conflict at a number of key stages in the
conduct of the class action lawsuit. The decisions (1) whether to certify
a class or subclass,5 9 (2) what, if any, notice to send to class members, 60
(3) whether to approve a proposed settlement,6' (4) whether to allow
intervention, 62 (5) how to structure a remedy,63 and (6) what the res
judicata effect of the judgment will be,64 may all require the court to
investigate conflict and consider its relevance.
The types of conflict that may arise vary considerably, ranging
from cases in which the "victims" of prohibited action simply prefer
not to sue65 or favor a particular outcome of the lawsuit, 66 to cases in
59 Class certification must take place under one of three subdivisions of Rule 23(b). This
Article is limited to discussion of "primarily injunctive" actions under Rule 23(b)(2) or "common
question" damage actions under Rule 23(b)(3). Under either subdivision, the provisions of 23(a)
also must be met, which require that the class be sufficiently numerous, that there be common
questions of law or fact, that the class representatives and their attorneys be "adequate", and that
the claim or defenses of named plaintiffs be "typical of the claims or defenses of the class." FED.
R. Civ. P. 23(a). The Supreme Court recently discussed the prerequisite for certification in Gen-
eral Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 102 S. Ct. 2364 (1982) (overturning "across-the-board" certification in a
title VII suit).
60 Notice to members of the class is required for all class actions certified under Rule 23(b)(3),
"including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort."
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2). Responses to notice may indicate conflict in the class. See infra notes 78-
158 and accompanying text (discussing the disagreement about how courts should treat such con-
flict). Notice is generally not held to be required for actions under Rule 23(b)(2), see, e.g., 3B J.
MOORE, supra note 45, § 23.72, though the court has broad discretion to order it at any time. FED.
R. Civ. P. 23(d)(2). Indeed, Rule 23(d)(2) suggests that notice is appropriate in order to inquire
whether class members "consider the representation fair and adequate." The responses of notice
may be used to assess the adequacy or typicality of the representative parties. See generally infra
notes 122-29 and accompanying text.
61 A class action cannot be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court, and
notice to class members and a hearing are required prior to approval. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e); 3B J.
MOORE, supra note 45, § 23.80[3]. Conflict that surfaces at this stage may convince a court not to
approve a settlement negotiated by the representative parties. See, e.g., Pettway v. American Cast
Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979). Dissent, however,
does not necessarily preclude judicial approval of a settlement; indeed, even the objections of
named class members may be rejected. See, e.g., Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 473 F.
Supp. 801, 805-09 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
62 See 3B J. MOORE, supra note 45, § 23.90[2]. Cf. Note, The Timeliness Threat to Intervention
of Right, 89 YALE L.J. 586 (1980) (discussing some problems with late intervention that may
prevent dissenters' views from being considered).
63 See, e.g., COLUMBIA Special Project, supra note 20, at 790-813.
64 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1973).
65 See, e.g., Doe v. Renfrew, 475 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ind. 1979) (some students favored dog
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which members of the victim-class actually obtain material benefits
from the prohibited practice or a practice that some particular remedy
might affect.67
The courts to date have not taken a consistent approach to
problems of conflict, and it would be pointless to search for a unifying
principle.68 The cases reveal considerable discretion at the federal dis-
searches for drugs in student lockers); Driver v. Helms, 74 F.R.D. 382 (D.R.I. 1977) (some persons
whose mail was opened by the CIA actually favored the practice). The situation could also arise
in a reverse race discrimination suit if white class members were to favor affirmative action. See
generally Germann v. Kipp, 429 F. Supp. 1323 (W.D. Mo. 1977), vacated on other grounds, 572
F.2d 1258 (8th Cir. 1978).
Opposition to suit may be based on class members' differing perceptions of their long-term
interests. This type of opposition has arisen in several common areas of litigation, such as class
actions to stop construction of highways, see, e.g., Swain v. Brinegar, 517 F.2d 766 (7th Cir. 1975);
Nolop v. Volpe, 333 F. Supp. 1364 (D.S.D. 1971), class actions to require due process hearings for
consumers, see, e.g., Ihrke v. Northern States Power Co., 459 F.2d 566 (8th Cir. 1972); Koger v.
Guarino, 412 F. Supp. 1375 (E.D. Pa. 1976), af'd, 549 F.2d 795 (3d Cir. 1977); Swarb v. Lennox,
314 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1970), a'd, 405 U.S. 191 (1972), class actions to eliminate maximum-
hours legislation for women, see, e.g., Ward v. Luttrell, 292 F. Supp. 165 (E.D. La. 1968), and
class actions to integrate schools, see Bell, supra note 10.
66 This is likely to occur in cases that seek to reform institutions, such as those that seek
construction or closing of schools, prisons, hospitals, and mental institutions. See, e.g., Coffin, The
Frontier ofRemedies: A Callfor Exploration, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 983 (1979); Fiss, supra note 20;
Reynolds, The Mechanics of Institutional Reform Litigation, 8 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 695 (1979-
1980); COLUMBIA Special Project, supra note 20. This is also likely to occur in cases that seek the
revision of employment practices.
As to the details of the remedy, different segments of the class may perceive their interests in
conflicting ways. The controversy over busing as a means to maximize racial balance in schools is
the best known example. See Bell, supra note 10; Correspondence, School Desegregation, 85
YALE L.J. 378 (1976). See generally Chambers, Class Action Litigation: Representing Diverse In-
terests of Class Members, 4 U. DAYTON L. REv. 353 (1979). Discrimination victims may oppose
merger of two unions or the development of particular job qualifications and seniority rules. See
Rodriguez v. East Texas Motor Freight Sys., 431 U.S. 395 (1977). Prisoners may prefer that re-
form lead to more work opportunities rather than only to treatment and education. See Glover v.
Johnson, 85 F.R.D. I (E.D. Mich. 1977). Finally, mental patients may not want an institution
ordered closed. See Halderman v. Penmhurst State School & Hosp., 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979) (en
banc), rev'don other grounds, 451 U.S. I (1981).
67 Class members opposed to a lawsuit or a particular remedy may fear, for example, that the
result will be to ruin an otherwise advantageous business relationship. Franchisees may oppose
an antitrust class action. See, e.g., Martino v. McDonalds Sys., 81 F.R.D. 81 (N.D. Ill. 1979);
Southern Snack Foods v. J & J Snack Foods Corp., 79 F.R.D. 678 (D.N.J. 1978). Stockholders
may oppose securities fraud class actions. See, e.g., Herbst v. ITT Corp., 495 F.2d 1308 (2d Cir.
1974); Korn v. Franchard Corp., 456 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir. 1972); Schy v. Susquehanna Corp., 419
F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970). Landowners may resist a class action
compelling full disclosure. See, e.g., Bryan v. Amrep Corp., 429 F. Supp. 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1977);
Lukenas v. Bryce's Mountain Resort, 66 F.R.D. 69 (W.D. Va. 1975), a'd, 538 F.2d 594 (4th Cir.
1976). In an extreme case, employees may wish to resist the enforcement of federal safety or
environmental rules if such enforcement might destroy the business defendant and thus leave the
employees jobless. See generally Reserve Mining Co. v. United States, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir.
1975), modpfed sub nom. Reserve Mining Co. v. Lord, 529 F.2d 181 (8th Cir. 1976).
68 It is interesting to note how the commentators have discussed judicial treatment of conflicts
within classes. Moore, for example, specifically discusses these conflicts only under "typicality,"
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trict court level in identifying what constitutes a serious conflict within
a class, 6 9 who has the burden of proving a conflict,7 ° what kind of evi-
dence is necessary or relevant, 7' and the appropriate action for the
court once actual or potential conflict is brought to its attention.72
Supreme Court authority on the issue is lacking, and the lower courts
seem to agree only on the rather vague standard that "[a]ntagonism
that defeats a class action must go to the subject matter of the suit."73
If substantial conflict appears, the court deems the class representative
"inadequate" or, less frequently, not "typical". 74
This section of the Article discusses three lines of case law and
commentary on class conflict and dissent. The first line takes an ap-
stating that, "'typicalness' is not a subjective test, authorizing a judge to dismiss a class action
based on a substantial legal claim where he thinks some member of the class may prefer to leave
the violation of their right unremedied." 3B J. MOORE, supra note 45, § 23.06, at 197. He then
criticizes cases that treat such conflict as being relevant to class certification. Id. § 23.06, at 197-98
n.29.
Wright and Miller, on the other hand, cite Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940), see infra
notes 78-84 and accompanying text, for the holding that "an action to enforce an agreement can-
not be brought on a class basis on behalf of persons allegedly bound by the agreement if some of
them do not wish to have it enforced." 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 56, § 1768, at 639.
In the supplement, however, the footnote to Hansberry is transformed into a reference to cases
holding that some opposition to enforcement should not preclude a class action, with a "but com-
pare" reference to cases that support the Hansberry statement. Id § 1768 n.94 (Supp. 1980). See
also id. § 1765.
Newberg is in accordance with the Wright & Miller supplement:
As a general rule, disapproval of the action by some class members should not be sufficient to
preclude a class action. Most courts that have faced the issue have held that this kind of
disagreement will not prevent class litigation; but some have focused on such dissension to
deny a class action.
1 H. NEWBERG, supra note 32, § 1120h, at 206.
69 Compare infra notes 78-98 and accompanying text with infra notes 99-129 and accompany-
ing text.
70 Compare, e.g., Peterson v. Oklahoma City Hous. Auth., 545 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1976) (see
infra text accompanying note 85) with Elliot v. Sperry Rand Corp., 79 F.R.D. 580 (D. Minn. 1978)
(see infra text accompanying notes 105-12).
71 Compare East Texas Motor Freight Sys. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395 (1977) (see infra text
accompanying notes 80-83) with Sperry Rand Corp. v. Larson, 554 F.2d 864 (8th Cir. 1977) (see
infra text accompanying notes 105-12).
72 Compare infra notes 130-41 and accompanying text with infra notes 142-58 and accompany-
ing text.
73 Berman v. Naragansett Racing Ass'n, 414 F.2d 311, 317 (1st Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 1037 (1970). See Social Servs. Union, Local 535 v. City of Santa Clara, 609 F.2d 944 (9th
Cir. 1979) (union bringing sex discrimination action); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Lord,
585 F.2d 860 (8th Cir. 1978) (sex discrimination); Sperry Rand Corp. v. Larson, 554 F.2d 868 (8th
Cir. 1977); HARVARD Study, supra note 20, at 1489-98.
74 While a consensus seems to be emerging about the "substantial conflict" formula, it has
been employed mainly by courts that decide that the conflict is insufficient to prevent class certifi-
cation. See supra note 73. Courts that have refused to certify the class have tended not to articu-
late a specific test beyond the requirements of adequacy and typicality. See infra notes 78-98 and
accompanying text.
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proach resembling the pure "consent" theory of class action,75 while
the second line adopts an approach similar to the pure "law enforce-
ment" theory.76 Precedents that follow each approach can be found,
and, unfortunately, federal district court judges currently choose from
either, depending on their views of a particular lawsuit. The third line
of authority urges an approach sensitive to the concerns of the other
two. It seeks to take the issue of conflict seriously and to develop
clearer guidelines for district court discretion. This approach, while
more promising than the others, also has some serious limitations, dis-
cussion of which leads to the approach suggested in this Article.77
Class Homogeneity or Consent as a Requirement
for Class Certffcation
Leading Supreme Court cases on conflict and dissent in class ac-
tions are ambiguous, but they suggest that any significant conflict per-
mits a denial of class action status. In Hansberry v. Lee,78 decided in
1940, the Court reversed an Illinois Supreme Court decision which held
that owners who brought a class action to enforce a racially restrictive
covenant adequately represented owners who opposed the covenant.
If representation had been adequate, those who opposed the covenant
would have been precluded on res judicata grounds from attacking its
validity in a second suit. The Court found that the class representatives
enforcing the covenant in the first action were in conflict with those
class members who wished to avoid enforcement and to sell to whom-
ever they chose. Due process, therefore, dictated that the class dissent-
ers be permitted to challenge the covenant. One possible interpretation
of Hansberry is that intraclass opposition to the result of a lawsuit-in
this case, the enforcement of the restrictive covenant-precludes the
use of a class action on behalf of dissenters. The facts of Hansberry,
however, are unique. It is peculiar to have a class action on behalf of
landowners against landowners who otherwise also would have been
members of the class, and the conflict could be seen as a material one.
Nonetheless, a number of courts have used Hansberry to deny class
status in other conflict situations.79
The Supreme Court's 1977 decision in East Texas Motor Freight
System v. Rodriguez,80 another case with very unusual facts, may rein-
force a limited interpretation of Hansberry. The Court there unani-
mously overturned a decision from the United States Court of Appeals
75 See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
76 See supra notes 15-35 and accompanying text.
77 See infra notes 159-214 and accompanying text.
78 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
79 See infra notes 84-91 and accompanying text.
80 431 U.S. 395 (1977).
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for the Fifth Circuit"' that allowedpost-trial class certification in an
employment discrimination lawsuit. In his opinion for the Court, Jus-
tice Stewart said that the named plaintiffs failed to achieve representa-
tive status for two reasons: lack of membership in the proposed class8 2
and inadequacy of representation. The Court based its finding of in-
adequate representation on the failure of plaintiffs' attorney to move
for class certification prior to trial and, more important here, on a vote
by plaintiffs' union local that overwhelmingly rejected the class relief
sought by the plaintiffs. The Court cited Hansberry without explana-
tion and found that, even though the union was not entirely coextensive
with the class, the plaintiffs were inadequate class representatives be-
cause of the antagonism shown through the union vote. Again, how-
ever, there were several bases for the Court's holding, and delay in the
decision to certify the class may have made it more difficult to use such
devices as subclassing to cope with the apparent conflict.
It is not clear whether East Texas Motor Freight is an accurate
indication of current Supreme Court thinking,8 3 but it undoubtedly
bolsters the series of lower court cases that already have interpreted
Hansberry and Rule 23 as meaning that class actions cannot proceed
when there is evidence of conflict between class representatives and
named plaintiffs.84 In Peterson v. Oklahoma City Housing Authority,85
for example, 811 of the 850 residents of a housing project for the eld-
erly paid a maintenance deposit that was contested on their behalf in a
81 Rodriguez v. East Texas Motor Freight Sys., 505 F.2d 40 (5th Cir. 1974).
82 431 U.S. at 403-06. Three named plaintiffs brought an action challenging a freight opera-
tor's practice of maintaining separate lists of city drivers and over-the-road drivers. The plaintiff-
city drivers complained of their inability to transfer to the over-the-road list, claiming that the no-
transfer rule discriminated against Black and Hispanic city drivers. The Supreme Court held that
plaintiffs could not bring a class action because they were not members of the class eligible for
transfer or hire as over-the-road drivers.
83 See generally HARVARD CIVIL RIGHTS-CIVIL LIBERTIES Comment, supra note 30. The
Court's determination to be strict in following Rule 23 requirements is evident, however, in Gen-
eral Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 102 S. Ct. 2364 (1982) (allegation that racial discrimination has occured
does not determine whether Rule 23 requirements for class actions will be met, nor does it define
the class that may be certified).
84 See, e.g., Swain v. Brinegar, 517 F.2d 766 (7th Cir. 1975) (some owners of farmland in path
of proposed highway wished to convey property); Schy v. Susquehanna Corp., 419 F.2d 1112 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970) (large percentage of class voted in favor of a merger);
Dierks v. Thompson, 414 F.2d 453 (1st Cir. 1969) (some individuals in a pension program favored
conservative investment plan); Carroll v. Associated Musicians of Greater New York, 316 F.2d
574 (2d Cir. 1963) (intraunion dispute over various work conditions); Giordano v. Radio Corp. of
Am., 183 F.2d 558, 560 (3d Cir. 1950) (action against union leadership); Lukenas v. Bryce's
Mountain Resort, 66 F.R.D. 69 (W.D. Va. 1975) (many buyers opposed lawsuit based on lack of
disclosure in land sales), aft'd, 538 F.2d 594 (4th Cir. 1976); Schulman v. Ritzenberg, 47 F.R.D.
202 (D.D.C. 1969) (47 out of 53 joint venturers rejected lawsuit based on usury); Ward v. Luttrell,
292 F. Supp. 165, 168 (E.D. La. 1968) (women preferred maximum-hours legislation); Wilson v.
Kelley, 294 F. Supp. 1005 (N.D. Ga.), aft'dper curiam, 393 U.S. 266 (1968) (some inmates pre-
ferred county work camps to state penitentiary).
85 545 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1976).
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Rule 23(b)(2) class action. The federal trial court refused to certify a
class of housing tenants, and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit affirmed in a two to one decision. The Tenth Circuit
opinions, however, did not state whether there was any real dispute
among class members about the propriety of the action or the desired
remedy-presumably the return of the deposits-and it is unclear
whether payment evidenced support for the mandatory deposit or
merely indicated acquiescence in what appeared to be inevitable. Fur-
thermore, it was not at all clear that those who paid would suffer in any
way if the lawsuit proceeded as a class action. The case probably can
best be explained as the result of hostility towards the merits, but the
holding stands for a particularly restrictive approach to class action
certification.
Two Fifth Circuit cases illustrate situations in which class dissent
was established on the record more clearly than in Peterson. In both
cases, the court of appeals affirmed lower court decisions denying certi-
fication in Rule 23(b)(2) suits. In Bailey v. Ryan Stevedoring Co.,86 an
employment race discrimination action, 204 of the 230 members of the
proposed class signed a petition opposing both the action and the class
representatives. In a race and sex discrimination action, Davis v. Road-
way Express, Inc. ,87 the court decertified the class when seventeen of
the twenty-three employee class members responded to notice by indi-
cating a desire not to participate. While these factual settings indicate
overwhelming class opposition, the opinions give little guidance to fu-
ture courts faced with class dissent. In Bailey, the court stated that "[it]
appears. . . that the views of a majority of the black longshoremen are
antagonistic with those of. . .the would-be standard bearer for the
proposed class, '' 88 while the court in Davis only affirmed the vague dis-
trict court finding that "this overwhelming vote of opposition indicated
a lack of common interests and perhaps even genuine antagonism."8 9
In light of the many courts that have used evidence of dissent to
deny class certification in Rule 23(b)(2) actions,90 some lower court de-
cisions simply apply a result oriented test. For example, one federal
district court that recently refused to certify a class of students in a
challenge to in-school searches bolstered its conclusion by stating sim-
ply that "[i]t is also very clear from the record that some students in this
high school are not in sympathy with the claims and contentions of this
86 528 F.2d 551 (5th Cir. 1976).
87 590 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1979), a'd on rehearing, 621 F.2d 775 (1980).
88 528 F.2d at 553.
89 590 F.2d at 144.
90 See supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text. In one recent case that rejected the sugges-
tion that conflict should preclude certification, the court commented that, "'[t]hough wholly with-
out merit, defendant's argument was not wholly without legal support." Glover v. Johnson, 85
F.R.D. 1, 5 n.3 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (action for prison reform).
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plaintiff."91
In analyzing class actions for damages under Rule 23(b)(3), courts
have applied a similar analysis to that used in the Rule 23(b)(2) injunc-
tion actions previously discussed. Unlike members in Rule 23(b)(2)
actions, members in Rule 23(b)(3) actions can opt out and avoid being
bound by the judgment. This option prompted the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, to
deemphasize class dissent.92 Other courts have tended to follow that
lead.93 Nevertheless, some lower courts still fail to distinguish between
actions in which opting out is permitted and those in which it is not.
94
In Phillps v. Klassen,95 a leading Rule 23(b)(3) decision, the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
failed to consider significant the ability to opt out. The court affirmed a
holding that postal employees challenging an early retirement plan
could not represent a class of all those who retired under that plan,
stating:
In view of the likelihood that there will be divergent views among the
employees who pursued the voluntary retirement route, as to whether
they have been injured or benefited we cannot say the District Court
erred in concluding that plaintiffs cannot fairly maintain the action they
have brought on behalf of more than 1,500 former employees.
96
This extreme view of the importance of dissent among class members is
especially difficult to justify in a Rule 23(b)(3) action. 97
Cases such as Phillis, whether decided under Rule 23(b)(2) or
Rule 23(b)(3), have inspired almost uniform criticism among commen-
tators. 98 As the commentators correctly point out, these decisions often
91 Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012, 1028 (N.D. Ind. 1979) (challenge to dog searches of
students for drugs).
92 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Prior to the 1966 revisions, members who failed to opt in were not
bound by the judgment.
93 391 F.2d 555, 563 (2d Cir. 1968). See, e.g., Marshall v. Holiday Magic, Inc., 550 F.2d 1173,
1179 (9th Cir. 1977). Prior to the 1966 revisions, however, courts did refuse to certify "where a
substantial part of the alleged class did not desire to be represented by the plaintiff-representative
or where the representatives were antagonistic to the class." 3B J. MOORE, supra note 45, app.
§ 23.10[7].
94 For recent Rule 23(b)(3) antitrust cases that fail to consider adequately the role of opt outs,
see Southern Snack Foods v. J & J Snack Foods Corp., 79 F.R.D. 678 (D.N.J. 1978) (past fran-
chisee cannot represent current franchisees because of confict over maintaining financial viability
of defendant); Windham v. American Brands, 68 F.R.D. 641 (D.S.C. 1975), aj7'd, 565 F.2d 59 (4th
Cir. 1977) (tobacco growers may favor price fixing). See also Comment, The Class Representatipe:
The Problem of the Absent Plaintiffs, 68 Nw. U.L. REV. 1133 (1974).
95 502 F.2d 362 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 996 (1974).
96 Id. at 367.
97 Possibly, the court really saw the case as one that in effect involved injunctive relief which,
if granted, would force all former employees to give up the benefits that induced their retirement.
There is, however, no explanation as to why this necessarily would be the result.
98 See, e.g., I H. NEWBERG, supra note 32, § 1120h, at 206 n.126, § 1120i, at 210; HARVARD
Study, supra note 20, at 1492 & n.194.
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fail to explore other means of controlling class conffict, are inconsistent
with other decisions, and may simply manifest a hostility to class action
law enforcement litigation. An increasing number of authorities on
class actions go further in their criticisms. They assert that the exist-
ence of class members who favor the status quo or a moderate remedy
should not prevent an action from proceeding on behalf of the class.
That position will be examined next.
Ignoring Conflict in the Interest of Legal Rights Enforcement
Most of the commentators and an increasing number of courts
have slighted or even ignored the problem of class conflict or dissent as
it relates to the desirability of the lawsuit or a particular remedy. Those
authorities prefer instead to focus on the suitability of the class action
device as a means for vindicating rights. They dismiss the subjective
concerns and perceived interests of class members on the philosophy
that rights which have been violated ought to be remedied. In Profes-
sor Moore's view, for instance, "the (b)(2) suit is not limited to situa-
tions in which each member of the class is aggrieved or wishes to
challenge the defendant's conduct, but it does require that the defend-
ant's conduct or lack of it be premised on a ground that is applicable to
the whole class." 99 Newberg presents this position cogently: "[Tihe
class member who wishes to remain a victim of unlawful conduct does
not have legally cognizable conflict with the named representative."' 100
Furthermore, "[a]ctual or potential disagreement regarding the nature
of relief sought need not prevent a finding of adequate representa-
tion."' 01 This approach finds its strongest statement in a recent Colum-
bia Law Review Special Project: "[Class members'] interest in the
status quo is legally irrelevant if in fact the defendant has been acting
in an illegal manner: the court will require that the status quo be modi-
fied to conform to the law regardless of the class membership's
wishes." 02
A few courts have taken this extreme position as well. One federal
district court, for example, indicated that "a judge may not refuse to
certify a class simply because some class members may prefer to leave
the violation of their rights unremedied." 10 3 Another stated that "the
fact that some members of the class are satisfied with the action com-
99 See 3B J. MooRE, supra note 45, § 23.4012], at 23-289 n.4.
100 1 H. NEWBERG, supra note 32, § 1120h, at 208.
101 Id. § 1120h, at 55 (Supp. 1980).
102 COLUMBIA Special Project, supra note 20, at 893.
103 Martino v. McDonald's Sys., 81 F.R.D. 81, 85 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (franchisee class for antitrust
action). Accord Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968) (attack-
ing redevelopment activities).
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plained of is irrelevant." 104 Nonetheless, the commentators have not
convinced most courts that Rule 23 lends itself to this very liberal
interpretatioff.
Elliot v. Sperry Rand Corp. 105 provides a particularly interesting
contrast to East Texas Motor Freight, in its view of the relevance of
intraclass dissent. In Elliot v. Sperry Rand, the plaintiff brought a class
action against Sperry Rand Corporation and its local and international
unions and charged sex discrimination in employment. As in East
Texas Motor Freight, the members of the local union indicated a strong
hostility towards the suit. They voted eighty-three to zero, with 101
members present, not to support the class action, and at least forty-two
of those voting were female. The local's business manager then re-
ceived a number of unsolicited petitions against the suit, containing 372
signatures, of which "some" were male. Nevertheless, the United
States District Court for the District of Minnesota certified the class.
Relying in part on the Fifth Circuit's opinion in East Texas Motor
Freight,10 6 which the Supreme Court had not yet overruled, the court
examined the vote and the petitions very carefully and found the evi-
dence of dissent "a good deal less than clear and convincing."' 10 7 It
suggested, moreover, that the test of conflicts "relating to the subject
matter of the litigation" refers primarily, perhaps exclusively, to antag-
onistic material conflicts. 10 8 Unless the class action would harm mate-
rial, objective interests of one part of the class, dissent could be ignored.
The court's only concession to the evidence of conflict was to order
notice to the class members.
Defendant sought review by mandamus, but the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit refused to overturn the lower
court's class certification decision.) 9 Although emphasizing the nar-
rowness of its review on mandamus, the appellate court nonetheless
specifically approved the lower court's analysis. The Supreme Court's
subsequent decision overruling the Fifth Circuit's decision in East
Texas Motor Freight110 prompted the defendant to renew his attack on
class certification, but the district court again refused to credit the evi-
dence of class members' opposition."' While the district court care-
fully argued that the dissenting members should be accommodated and
104 Housing Auth. of Omaha v. United States Hous. Auth., 54 F.R.D. 402, 404 (D. Neb. 1972)
(attacking provision in HUD circular).
105 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1557 (D. Minn. 1976), aftdsub nom. Sperry Rand Corp. v.
Larson, 554 F.2d 868 (8th Cir. 1977).
106 Rodriguez'v. East Texas Motor Freight Sys., 505 F.2d 40 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 431 U.S. 395
(1977).
107 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1566-69.
108 Id. at 1571-72.
109 Sperry Rand Corp. v. Larson, 554 F.2d 868 (8th Cir. 1977).
110 431 U.S. 395 (1977). See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
I Elliot v. Sperry Rand Corp., 79 F.R.D. 580 (D. Minn. 1979).
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should not be used as a basis for decertification, it is difficult to recon-
cile such reasoning with the Supreme Court's decision in East Texas
Motor Freight. 12
Lerwill v. Inflight Motion Pictures, Inc., 13 a class action by some
union members on behalf of other members, represents a recent and
fairly sophisticated appellate discussion of intraclass conflict from a
strong legal rights enforcement perspective.1 4 The plaintiffs in Lerwill
sought, through a Rule 23(b)(3) action, to recover overtime wages that
union members were not being paid. Defendant claimed "that the bulk
of the class members favored a waiver of overtime provisions and
would not support a suit to enforce the contract terms." 115 The mem-
bers feared that, if the class prevailed in the suit, the employer would
simply hire more employees rather than pay overtime, and the result
would be less total pay for current union members. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's cer-
tification of the class, stating as its rationale the fact that the dissenters
could opt out and a presumption "that it was in the general class inter-
est to assert these rights." 116 Moreover, the court stated in a footnote
that "there is a substantial question whether employees can be deemed
to oppose rights which are not only the product of a collective bargain-
ing agreement but also are mandated by statute." 117 The court thus
suggested that it favored rights enforcement through the class action
device, even though contrary to the wishes of most, or perhaps nearly
all, class members. This contrasts strongly with the District of Colum-
bia Circuit's approach and holding in Phill#s v. Kassen. 118
In these rights-oriented cases, the actual views of class members
are subordinate to the overriding interest in rights vindication-thepre-
sumed interest of class members. The cases also recognize, however,
that if there is a certain threshold showing of dissent in a Rule 23(b)(2)
action, the trial court should order that notice be sent to the class. In an
112 The district court's attempt to reconcile Rodriguez with Sperry Rand failed to distinguish
the two cases:
The court notes that its previous decision did not rely on Rodriguez alone, but on principles
drawn from other cases as well .... Moreover, the Supreme Court opinion cannot be viewed
as holding that as a matter of law any vote by class members or putative members contrary to
some expressed view of named plaintiffs makes certification improper. That determination
necessarily turns on the facts of each case.
Id. at 583.
113 582 F.2d 507 (9th Cir. 1978).
114 One reason for the disproportionate number of reported cases of conflict and dissent involv-
ing unions is that there are mechanisms within unions-union meetings, for example-for uncov-
ering conflict. Such mechanisms do not exist within most classes. That is not to say that there is
more conflict in unions, only that it tends to be discovered more often.
115 582 F.2d at 512.
116 Id. The court did note, however, that opting out might not always protect dissident
employees.
117 Id. at 512 n.4.
118 502 F.2d at 362. See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
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extreme case, the class members' responses to the notice in either a
Rule 23(b)(2) or (b)(3) action may dictate that the court must decertify
the class. Thus, the court in Elliot v. Sperry Rand, a Rule 23(b)(2) ac-
tion, ordered the class representatives to send notice to the class. 119
Presumably, the court would have decertified the class if the class had
responded negatively and if it could not resolve the conffict by redefin-
ing the class or creating subclasses.120 Similarly, the court in Lerwill
might have confronted directly the issue of decertification if it had de-
termined that opting out was not a complete solution to "[protect] the
interests of any dissident employees."' 121
The legal community has given considerable support to the ap-
proaches to class conflict taken in the cases just discussed. Commenta-
tors often agree that notice in Rule 23(b)(2) actions and opting out 122 in
Rule 23(b)(3) actions solve the problem of class conffict. 123 Not many
courts, however, have chosen thus far to follow those approaches. No-
tice is still generally discretionary in Rule 23(b)(2) actions, 124 and there
is little appellate scrutiny of how lower courts exercise that discretion.
Trial courts are reluctant to order such notice in Rule 23(b)(2) actions
since they are not specifically required to do so. 125 They often proceed
according to the theory that, by definition, "a (b)(2) class is. . . homo-
geneous without any conflicting interests between the members of the
class."' 126 Indeed, Elliot v. Sperry Rand is one of only a few reported
decisions ordering discretionary notice. 127
119 The court sought through notice to obtain, inter alia, the following information from recipi-
ents:
(1) [W]hether the recipient is opposed to this lawsuit; (2) if there is opposition, what the
source of that opposition is; (3) whether the recipient would desire to intervene in this case
either with her own counsel or with counsel presently representing the class; and (4) if there is
opposition and if the recipient does not wish to intervene, whether the recipient would wish to
see other class members intervene, and, if so, whom the recipient feels would be appropriate
intervenors.
Elliot v. Sperry Rand Corp., 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1571.
120 The court did not specifically state, however, that it was contemplating decertification. It
suggested only that the court might fashion remedies to reduce any antagonism. Id.
121 Lerwill v. Inflight Motion Pictures, 582 F.2d at 512.
122 The Harvard Study, however, takes the position that "provision of any opt-out right what-
soever is difficult to defend" for either 23(b)(2) or (b)(3) class actions. See HARVARD Study, supra
note 20, at 1488-89.
123 See, e.g., 3B J. MOORE, supra note 45, § 23.72; 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 56,
§ 1768; 7A id. § 1793; HARVARD Developments, supra note 22, at 1447-57.
124 See supra note 60.
125 This is one reason for judicial preference for 23(b)(2) over 23(b)(3) certification in civil
rights cases. See, e.g., Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 255-57 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 1011 (1975).
126 Id. at 256.
127 See supra note 119 and accompanying text. See also Rosen, Title VII Classes and Due
Process- To (b)(2) or Not to (b)(3), 25 WAYNE L. REV. 919, 946-49 (1980); BOSTON Note, supra
note 37, at 689-70. Advocates of more widespread notice admittedly received a boost from John-
son v. General Motors Corp., 598 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1979). Johnson, however, required notice to
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Furthermore, notice, even when sent, is not necessarily designed to
ferret out any dissent or conflict. Notice is usually very general; in
Rule 23(b)(2) actions, it asks only if the recipient wishes to participate,
and in Rule 23(b)(3) actions, it asks only if the recipient wishes to opt
out. For example, discretionary notice in a recent sex discrimination
class action brought in the United States District Court for the District
of Massachusetts did not mention potential conflicts, nor did it address
the questions of adequacy of representation or typicality. 128
Moreover, the question remains of just how the court should han-
dle class members' responses to a suitable form of notice. Opt out re-
quests in Rule 23(b)(3) actions present no problem, but the court in a
Rule 23(b)(2) action may be faced with a confusing array of responses
that preclude an easy solution. Indeed, one or more prudent members
of a Rule 23(b)(3) class may point out that despite their opposition to
class certification, they will be forced to participate if the action goes
ahead in order to ensure that they receive the recovery to which each
member of the class is entitled. 129 The court, in any event, will have to
face the issues of whether to decertify, restructure, or otherwise modify
the class. More generally, the court will have to determine what the
impact of the dissent should be on the outcome of the lawsuit. The
court could simply refuse to certify the class, thereby preventing rights
enforcement, or it could ignore the dissent in favor of rights enforce-
ment, or it could try to accommodate the conflict while allowing the
class action to proceed. Obviously, the third approach is the one that
offers the most promise, and it merits close attention.
Getting the Issues Before the Court
Commentators such as Professors Chayes and Fiss have developed
the principle that the trial court has a duty to uncover conflict and to
handle it creatively. 130 In his recent careful study of "structural re-
form" lawsuits, Professor Fiss discusses in large part the type of law
class members only where backpay awards are sought in 23(b)(2) actions brought under title VII.
See Note, Class Actions: Cerification and Notice Requirements, 68 GEO. L.J. 1009 (1980); Note,
Notice in Rule 23(b)(2) Class ,4ctionsfor Monetary Relief Johnson v. General Motors Corp., 128
U. PA. L. REv. 1236 (1980). Notice need not be particularly expensive, since it would not have to
be individualized. Class members may be reached by other means that are just as effective, such as
notices at the work place in some title VII actions or even "sampling notice" where a large class is
involved. BOSTON Note, supra note 37, at 691-94.
128 Key v. Gillette Co., 90 F.R.D..606 (D. Mass. 1981). But see supra note 119.
129 As the Harvard Study suggests: "Each class member, fearful that other class members will
claim their recovery, may conclude that forgiving the class opponent will have little practical
effect, and take the 'second best' course of seeking relief." HARVARD Study, supra note 20, at 1493.
130 This Article focuses on Chayes, supra note 20, and Fiss, supra note 20, because they have
written the leading analyses of this type of litigation, which Chayes generally calls "public law"
litigation and a portion of which Fiss terms "structural reform" litigation. This position is also
consistent with HARVARD Study, supra note 20, HARVARD Developments, supra note 22, and Co-
LUMBIA Special Project, supra note 20. Other generally favorable perspectives on this litigation
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enforcement litigation discussed here.13 1 He argues that it "seems
almost absurd to rely on the initiatives of those persons or agencies who
happen to be named plaintiff and defendant." 132 Therefore, he sug-
gests, "[t]he more appropriate response, and the one typically employed
in the structural context is for the judge--often acting on his own-to
construct a broader representational framework."' 33  Because the
court's decision in such cases will have an impact on a large number of
persons, a fair decision requires that the court "tolerates, or even in-
vites, a multiplicity of spokesmen. . . each perhaps representing differ-
ent views as to what is the interest of the victim group." 134 According
to Professor Fiss, the touchstone for a good judicial decision or ap-
proved settlement is whether the court has considered all the relevant
interests. This does not mean that class actions will not vindicate
rights, but rather that courts should use discretion in deciding precisely
how to structure the relief.
Several school desegregation cases appear to have adopted this
thoughtful approach. For example, the three judge panel in Evans v.
Buchanan 135 stated that disagreements over the remedy sought would
not prevent the Wilmington school desegregation action from proceed-
ing on behalf of a class. The court emphasized that all the positions
were before the court and all the arguments presented. 136 Relief, there-
fore, could be structured to accommodate the various positions. 137 Liti-
gation thus becomes very much like an administrative hearing or even
a town meeting, as Professor Yeazell suggested 138 when discussing the
Los Angeles school desegregation litigation. 39 As Yeazell notes, the
litigation may be expanded to the point that "anyone who can articu-
are included in Problems of Intervention in Public Law Litigatirn A Symposisum, 13 U.C. DAvis
L. REV. 211 (1980).
131 According to Fiss,
[sitructural reform is premised on the notion that the quality of our social life is affected in
important ways by the operation of large-scale organizations, not just by individuals acting
either beyond or within these organizations. It is also premised on the belief that our consti-
tutional values cannot be fully secured without effectuating basic changes in the structure of
those organizations. The structural suit is one in which a judge, confronting a state bureau-
cracy over values of constitutional dimension, undertakes to restructure the organization to
eliminate a threat to those values posed by the present institutional arrangements. The in-
junction is the means by which these reconstructive directives are transmitted.
Fiss, supra note 20, at 2.
132 Id. at 26.
133 Id
134 Id. at 21.
135 416 F. Supp. 328 (D. Del. 1976).
136 Id at 338 ("[tlhrough the presentations of all parties to this suit, and that of all amici, the
Court has been thoroughly informed of the differing views on remedy").
137 For another school desegregation case that carefully considers the various positions, see
Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Bd. of Educ., 298 F. Supp 203 (D. Conn. 1968), aft'd, 423 F.2d 121
(2d Cir. 1970).
138 Yeazell, supra note 6, at 244, 260.
139 Crawford v. Board of Educ., 17 Cal. 3d 280, 551 P.2d 28, 130 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1976).
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late an interest shared by some significant number of persons and not
already represented in the litigation can participate, at least to the ex-
tent of submitting briefs."'140
This approach is attractive as a general solution to class conflict
and dissent. The court may hear all the arguments, consider all the
interests, and develop a form of relief that binds everyone, protects
interests to the greatest extent possible, and still remedies violations of
the law. Indeed, this solution seems far superior to traditional notions
of litigation.' 4' Yet, one may argue that this solution is both too radical
and not radical enough. While no doubt preferable to approaches that
overemphasize or underemphasize the significance of class dissent, it
suffers from defects that limit its effectiveness both in coping with con-
flict and in producing fair and lasting results.
First, the approach relies too much on the unfettered discretion of
trial court judges, both in deciding whether to widen the scope of the
litigation and in structuring the remedy. 142 Ideally, the trial court
judge should be careful to ensure that all potential viewpoints are rep-
resented, but little guidance is provided to assist the trial court in that
endeavor or to assist the appellate court in reviewing the trial court's
actions. Notice is discretionary in 23(b)(2) actions, as are subclassing,
redefinition of the class, and intervention-the other tools for broaden-
ing representation. Discretion may be reviewed when the existence of
conflict or dissent is clear on the record, but the record may obscure
relatively long range material conflicts or conflicts that reflect only dif-
fering perceptions of similar interests. Many conflicts are no doubt
hidden from the trial court. Under this approach, judges do not have a
duty, subject to review, to probe beyond named representatives into the
nature of the class.
Trial court discretion permits thoughtful and creative procedures,
but it does not maximize their utilization. "Structural reform" law-
suits' 43 implicate strongly felt political values, and broad trial court dis-
cretion is an invitation to a result-oriented jurisprudence, which may
not work justice in these often complicated and controversial actions. 144
An approach must be found that both provides guidance for the consci-
140 Yeazell, supra note 6, at 260 n.69.
141 See Cavanagh & Sarat, ThinkingAbout Courts: TowardandBeyonda Jurisprudence ofJudi-
cial Competence, 14 LAw & Soc'y REv. 371 (1980); Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra note 20. See also
infra notes 222-30 and accompanying text.
142 There are good reasons for investing trial courts with some discretion in this area, see gener-
ally Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion in the Trial Court-Viewed From Above, 22 SYRAcusE L. REV.
635 (1971), but the suggested approach leaves too much opportunity for judges to rule without
even considering the relevant factors.
143 See supra note 131.
144 Indeed, one commentator has stated that divergent decisions on class actions in title VII
cases can be explained only by the preferences of individual judges. 2 A. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION § 49.51 (1975).
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entious trial judge and ensures that trial courts focus on the appropriate
concerns.
A second problem with the town meeting approach is that it does
not guide trial courts in determining whether and under what circum-
stances class dissent or conflict should preclude class certification. 145
Rule 23 requires more than a common violation of a group's legal
rights, and, therefore, situations must exist in which dissent is sufficient
to prevent the action from proceeding on behalf of a class. 146 If conflict
should sometimes prevent class certification, then standards must be
articulated that will limit the circumstances in which non-certification
is required.
In addition, since this approach will allow many class actions to
proceed even though there is evidence of class dissent, conflict at later
stages of the lawsuit--especially the settlement or remedy stages-must
also be accommodated. If courts are the appropriate forums in which
to handle these non-traditional actions which, as noted before, may re-
semble town meetings, then court procedures must adapt to fit such
actions more accurately. It is not sufficient for a court merely to hear all
the arguments and viewpoints of those affected by the lawsuit. The
court's discretion in shaping the remedy must be informed by knowl-
edge of the actual constituencies supporting each of the various
arguments.
A series of cases involving Hispanic interests in school desegrega-
tion illustrate this point. Hispanic parents sought to intervene in Cis-
neros v. Corpus Christi Independent School District147 and Bradley v.
Milliken ,'48 school desegregation class actions. The parents in Cisneros
wished to prevent a settlement and to litigate on the merits; the parents
in Bradley sought to intervene on the grounds that bilingual education
in Detroit would be threatened if Hispanic students were dispersed to
different schools in order to facilitate desegregation. The trial courts
denied intervention and were upheld on appeal on the grounds that the
145 It has been suggested, for example, that courts should limit denial of class status to rela-
tively rare situations, including some clear material conflicts of interest ("Hobbesian classes"), and
some cases where there is such opposition to the lawsuit that the lawsuit may "discourage unduly
the conduct regulated" by a statutory scheme. HARVARD Study, supra note 20, at 1495-98. Ac-
cording to this view, "there is room to wonder why a court would ever terminate a class suit for
fear that the interests of class members would not be adequately represented." Id. at 1489.
146 One might suspect, for example, that even many strong supporters of class actions to en-
force civil rights might be willing to use intraclass dissent to prevent a "reverse discrimination"
class action. Cf. Germann v. Kipp, 429 F. Supp. 1323, 1330 (W.D. Mo. 1977) (refusing to certify
a class on the ground that some minority fire fighters benefited from the challenged affirmative
action plan, although the class evidently could have proceeded on behalf of all non-minority fire
fighters).
147 560 F.2d 190 (5th Cir. 1977).
148 620 F.2d 1141 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 870 (1980).
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school board previously had made all the relevant arguments. 149
The trial courts, however, could have invoked their discretion so as
to give more attention to the Hispanic interests. Those interests clearly
would have been presented more sympathetically by Hispanic inter-
venors than by a school board. 150 The trial courts also might have been
more disposed to formulate remedies in line with the Hispanics' argu-
ments had they been aware of the Hispanics' constituencies. By the
nature of these cases, the trial courts had to pick and choose among
various more or less political arguments, and Hispanics have a political
significance quite different from the school board. These cases thus
show that it is inadequate, even dangerous, for a court to refuse inter-
vention just because one party already has voiced a particular
argument.
A recent opinion from the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, Mendoza v. United States,'51 illustrates a similar prob-
lem and also points out the "political" significance of constituencies. In
this case, the trial court refused to allow a group of Hispanics to form a
subclass in order to make its own argument in favor of keeping certain
Tucson schools open. As in Cisneros and Bradley, the court deter-
mined that it had heard all the arguments and it denied the subclass. 152
In upholding the trial court's rejection of the subclass, and in approving
a settlement opposed by the Hispanic groups, the Ninth Circuit re-
ferred to a leading Fifth Circuit opinion, Pe/tway v. American Cast Iron
Pfpe Co., t53 in which the number of dissenters in the class clearly had
helped to persuade the court to reject a proposed settlement in a title
VII class action. The Ninth Circuit in Mendoza distinguished Pettway
on its facts: "While we do not suggest that the quantity of objectors
will determine whether the settlement proposal should be rejected, that
factor . . . renders Pettway a poor factual analogue . . . . ',154 As a
practical matter, the number of dissenters is important in the decision
whether to approve or modify a proposed settlement, 55 but the Ninth
Circuit refused to admit that the number of people desiring a subclass
149 Bradley v. Milliken, 620 F.2d at 1142; Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Ind. School Dist., 560
F.2d at 191.
150 Although the result might have been the same if the court had allowed the Hispanics to
intervene, one might contend that the trial court deprived itself of the input of a group with a
serious personal stake in the outcome. That group's argument would have had a different quality,
if not a different legal substance, than the school board's.
151 623 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1980).
152 Id. at 1350. The court also noted that it was "not clear" how the subclass stood with respect
to issues other than the closing of the schools. Unfortunately, the creation of a subclass was prob-
ably the only way to make those feelings clear in the context of this lawsuit.
153 576 F.2d 1157 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979).
154 Mendoza v. United States, 623 F.2d at 1349 n.12.
155 See, e.g., Flinn v. FMC Corp., 528 F.2d 1169 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 967
(1976); Bryan v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 494 F.2d 799, 803 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
900 (1975). These cases stand for the proposition that the degree of opposition or support is rele-
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might also be important in deciding whether to allow it. According to
the court, the proposed subclass did not need to be established since its
arguments had been made. As a result, the trial court had no practical
means of probing the depth of the Hispanics' opposition to the
settlement. 156
Numbers and actual constituencies do influence the court, and it is
disingenuous to hold that only "arguments" are relevant. For example,
in Calhoun v. Cook, 157 an earlier school desegregation lawsuit, a three
judge panel of the United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Georgia rejected a plan favored by national lawyers for the
NAACP that would have resulted in considerable busing. The court
clearly was persuaded not merely by the cogency of the defendant
school board's arguments. Rather, the court was influenced by the lo-
cal NAACP and a number of unsolicited petitions that supported a
remedy involving less busing. The national NAACP appealed the de-
cision, but the Fifth Circuit upheld the trial court's remedy. 58
Courts ought to consider actual constituencies, not merely argu-
ments, while shaping a decree. One problem with the emerging town
meeting view of litigation is that a court presented only with argu-
ments, not with the representatives of real constituencies, might ignore
the interests and views of what might be a majority of a lawsuit's bene-
ficiaries. Any solution to the problem of ideological conflict in class
actions must recognize that not only rights are at stake and not only
legal arguments are relevant to the outcome.
vant to the decision whether to approve the settlement. They do not hold that the court must take
a vote to determine the number of dissenters. See also 3B J. MOORE, supra note 45, § 23.80[41.
156 Plaintiffs in Mendoza initiated the school desegregation action in Tucson on behalf of a
class of Mexican-Americans in 1974. It was consolidated with a similar action on behalf of black
children and tried in January, 1977. After trial and prior to the resolution of post-trial motions,
plaintiffs in both actions informed the court that they were discussing settlement. The settlement
plan was filed July 17, 1978, and Sanchez, a member of the Mexican-American class, took excep-
tion to part of it. He requested a substitution of counsel on July 27, and received new counsel on
August 3. On August 4, he moved to create a subclass of parents and children in the attendance
areas of schools sought to be closed. He also moved to continue the hearings on the plan, which
were set to begin on August 8. Sanchez then presented testimony at the hearings on August 8 and
9. On August 11, the court tentatively approved the plan for the purpose of giving notice to class
members and denied the motion to create a subclass. Sanchez then filed his own opposition at the
final settlement hearing on August 30 and 31, but the court rejected his objections.
A subclass would have allowed Sanchez to argue on behalf of others in addition to himself.
Class support clearly would have enhanced the persuasive power of his argument. The court
unfortunately did not explore fully whether there was indeed a "subclass" of persons who shared
Sanchez's opposition to the closing of three schools.
157 362 F. Supp. 1249 (N.D. Ga. 1973), remanded, 487 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1973), decision upon
remand ajifd, 522 F.2d 717, reh'g denied, 525 F.2d 1203 (1975). See generally Bell supra note 10,
at 485-87.
158 Calhoun v. Cook, 522 F.2d 717 (5th Cir. 1975).
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A SUGGESTED APPROACH
As Professors Cover and Fiss suggest, it is necessary "to consider
whether the continued use of a formal construct [the class] may have an
ultimately dehumanizing effect if it is imbued with a life of its own,
apart from the natural persons for whom it was once a tool.' 59 A
proper approach to intraclass conflict must take into account the virtues
of class actions as well as the problems that may arise from ignoring the
"natural persons" who comprise formal classes.
The class action device facilitates the creation of a unit with some
of the attributes of an organization: an identifiable membership, en-
hanced bargaining power from aggregation of claims, and leaders who
speak for the group. It is extremely difficult to organize many of the
groups whose rights are violated.160 Absent the class action device,
therefore, it might be impossible or, at the least, very expensive to en-
force a group's rights. As one commentator has said, "the class action
may . . . be thought of as a device for securing the benefits of scale
without undergoing the outlay for organizing."' 16 1
Courts, therefore, should not require that all class members con-
sent to a lawsuit. Instead, courts should encourage lawyers and others
interested in rights enforcement to seek out, inform, and mobilize those
who stand to be affected by class actions. As Professor Bell said, courts
should not allow the class action device to be used as a "barrier to
expression of dissent." 6 2 The courts should ensure that "private attor-
neys general ' 163 and class representatives seek out dissent and attempt
to persuade class members that the action is indeed in their bestinterest. t64
The Basic Test for Cerification
The court must explore the issue of class conflict in depth at the
certification stage as well as at later stages of the lawsuit.165 The court
should apply the same criteria to both the certification decision and a
decision to decertify after it obtains further information. The key issue
to the court is whether, in the given circumstances, the lawsuit should
proceed as a class action with the named plaintiffs as representatives.
159 R. COVER & 0. Fiss, THE STRUCTURE OF PROCEDURE 255 (1979).
160 See generally J. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM (1978); M. OL-
SON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965).
161 Galanter, Delivering Legality: Some Proposals for the Direction of Research, 11 LAW &
Soc'Y REV. 225, 240 (1976).
162 Bell, supra note 10, at 505.
163 See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
164 The Supreme Court's decision in Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89 (1981), suggests that
courts must permit this discussion. See also YALE Note, Conflicts, supra note 1. In the past, courts
have often prohibited communication conducted without court consent.
165 Certification here means the decision to allow an action to proceed on behalf of the class.
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The plaintiff class representatives already bear the burden of es-
tablishing that the action meets all the requirements of Rule 23, includ-
ing adequacy of representation and typicality.1 66 In addition, the
plaintiff and class attorney should have a duty to bring to the court's
attention any conflicts that they anticipate or that they have discovered
through prior contact with class members.' 67 This requirement is con-
sistent with decisions stating that the class attorney owes a fiduciary
duty to all members of the class. 68 In addition, the court must ascer-
tain through discussion with the parties and communications with the
class just how serious conflicts and dissent are or might be. If the court
fails to conduct an adequate inquiry, an appellate court may reverse its
certification decision, or the lawsuit may be subject to collateral attack
by a class member whose interests were not represented.
The test that the trial court should apply if it discovers dissent can
be expressed in terms consistent with prevailing federal case law: class
representatives are not adequate under Rule 23(a)(4) if there is substan-
tial conflict within the class going to the subject matter of the lawsuit.169
While this formulation does not differ from that which courts currently
apply, a more precise statement of the appropriate analysis within the
framework of Rule 23 is needed to guide district court discretion.
The purpose here is to provide that statement. A preliminary con-
cern, however, is to ensure that the trial court provides a record of its
investigation and consideration of any potential conflicts. This will en-
able a reviewing court or a court faced with a collateral challenge to the
adequacy of representation to ascertain what conflicts came to the
court's attention and how it treated them. 70 In making its findings, the
166 See, e.g., 3B J.,MOORE, supra note 45, § 23.02-2.
167 Such a duty could be reviewed by a collateral attack on the class action judgment. See
Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1973); Note, Collateral Attack on the Binding Effect of
Class Action Judgments, 87 HARV. L. REv. 589 (1974).
168 See, e.g., Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157 (5th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979); National Ass'n of Regional Medical Programs, Inc. v. Mathews, 551
F.2d 340 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 954 (1977). As stated by the Harvard Study, "the
first obligation of the class attorney, therefore, should be to discover the range of interests held by
class members. He ought also to report conflicts of interest among class members to the judge."
HARVARD Study, supra note 20, at 1595. See also Bellow & Kettleson, supra note 24, at 361;
HARVARD Developments, supra note 22, at 1456.
While the defense has an incentive to seek out potential conflicts and bring them to the atten-
tion of the court, its ability to contact class members is limited. See, e.g., FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CENTER, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LiTIGATION, .pt. I, § 1.41 (1978). A recent case of abuses by
defendants is Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 78 F.R.D. 108 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
169 This standard is favored by courts that do not wish to find sufficient conflict to prevent
certification. See supra notes 73 & 74.
170 Courts often make such findings when they approve class action settlements and accept
guilty pleas. See, e.g., Mandujano v. Basic Vegetable Prods., 541 F.2d 832 (9th Cir. 1976); Of-
ficers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 473 F. Supp. 801, 805-09 (N.D. Cal. 1978); 3B J. MOORE,
supra note 45, § 23.80[4]. For judicial findings on issues of voluntariness when accepting guilty
pleas, see FED. R. CRIM. P. 11.
Class Actions
trial court must recognize and consider interests not before it, such as
those of absent class members. It is useful, therefore, to place a burden
on the court not only to make findings, but also to explain its findings
and the bases on which it made them. The court certifying a class
should explain, for example, why it made a finding of no conflict, why
it thought notice unnecessary, and why it believed it could consider and
control any potential conflict or dissent through the existing or pro-
posed representational structure.171 This requirement alone might
reduce considerably the problem of conflict simply by forcing judges to
focus on the appropriate issues and reminding them of the need to ex-
ercise discretion carefully. 172
The trial court should apply the "substantial opposition" test ac-
cording to a three-part analysis. First, the court should ascertain
whether all the members of the proposed class stand in the same objec-
tive position with respect to the alleged violation of the law.' 73 This
inquiry is now a matter of course; the issue here is whether such an
inquiry alone is sufficient. Second, the court must reach a conclusion,
even if tentative, as to the scope of conflict and dissent within the class.
Third, the court should determine whether any conflicts are substantial
enough to preclude certification of the class. This method of analysis is
consistent with the approach that a thoughtful court already might
follow.
The third part of the test, however, should be made more concrete.
The court should concentrate on three basic factors in deciding whether
existing conflict ought to prevent certification: (1) whether the litigants
and their attorneys are appropriate law enforcers; (2) the general char-
acteristics of the class; and (3) the potential impact on the class of the
relief sought. These factors will determine whether the court should
certify the class, what, if any, notice should be sent to class members,
and how the court should treat responses to the notice. In considering
these factors, the court should be reluctant to deny the benefits of the
class action device to a truly representative plaintiff or accountable at-
torney general surrogate. Finally, the court should apply its knowledge
of class members' interests and views to such discretionary decisions as
how to structure the remedy.
Qual4fcations of class representatives and their attorneys.- Courts
routinely inquire into the qualifications, skill, and experience of class
attorneys. 174 They also consider the named plaintiffs' responsibility
171 Similarly, a court examining a class action settlement discusses and disposes of each objec-
tion to a proposed settlement.
172 Accordingly, reviewing courts should recognize the need for trial discretion, but they should
still exert some control over it.
173 See 3B J. MooRE, su.pra note 45, § 23.04.
174 See id, § 23.07[l.
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and commitment to the litigation. t75 The first inquiry into adequacy of
representation under this test should build on these investigations. Ini-
tially, the court should focus on the lawyers and representatives as a
"legal rights entity." If the court finds that the representatives and their
lawyers are accountable to the group ostensibly benefiting from the
lawsuit-particularly if they represent a relatively broad-based, ongo-
ing organization-and if the court finds that the lawsuit bears some
relationship to the organization's goals, the court should find the repre-
sentatives to be adequate, even if there exists some class dissent. To the
extent that the class representatives and their lawyers are supported by
an organization that seeks to protect the interests of those whom the
class action is intended to benefit, concern over the lack of accountabil-
ity is diminished. The court may assume that the representatives' law-
yers will conduct the lawsuit with sensitivity to the views of the
organization. 176 In contrast, where class representatives and their law-
yers have no organizational support, the accountability problem looms
larger. In those cases, the court should apply a higher standard in de-
termining whether the class representative is adequate. Analogous
Supreme Court precedents support a dual standard. The Court in In re
Primus177 and Ohralik v. Ohio State BarAssociation 178 stated that bona
fide legal rights organizations have greater freedom to promote their
law enforcement services than self-interested and relatively unaccount-
able private attorneys.179
175 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67, 72-73 n. 10 (5th Cir. 1973). See generally
Hohmann v. Packard Instrument Co., 399 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1968); Seiden v. Nicholson, 69
F.R.D. 681 (N.D. Ill. 1976); American Swiss Int'l Corp. v. Heublein, Inc., 69 F.R.D. 663 (N.D.
Ga. 1975).
176 See supra note 41. If the legal rights entity shares in the political accountability of a public
attorney general, then the court can also be less concerned with class dissent. See supra text
accompanying note 34. Thus, for example, it was reported in 1970 that California Rural Legal
Assistance (CRLA), a federally funded legal aid organization, brought class actions only: (I)
when the client had more than a nominal interest in the suit; (2) after CRLA had consulted with
relevant poverty organizations to see if they favored the action and relief sought; and (3) after
general discussion with client groups about the particular class action. See YALE Note, Public
Interest, supra note 38, at 1125. Because public legal services organizations such as CRLA are
accountable to the general public, courts should defer to the organizations' decisions regarding
what rights to enforce through class actions. The public continually scrutinized CRLA's activities
and funded their activities, although not without some controversy. Furthermore, CRLA did not
depend solely upon its public status to legitimize its law enforcement; it consulted with relevant
constituencies before proceeding with class actions. Other methods to assure responsiveness and
accountability were discussed recently in YALE Note, In Defense, supra note 38, at 1455-56. See
also Rabin, Lawyersfor Social Change: Perspectives on Public Interest Law, 28 STAN. L. REV. 207
(1976).
177 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
178 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
179 See Comment, In-Person Solicitation by Public Interest Law Firms: 4 Look at the AB,4
Code Provisions in Light of Primus and Ohralik, 49 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 309 (1981). A double
standard between legal rights organizations and private attorneys is made explicit in the Kutak
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Bona fide legal rights organizations, however, should not automat-
ically obtain class certification. Indeed, in his article arguing that class
actions are nonrepresentative, Professor Bell attacks precisely the or-
ganization that has achieved the most legitimacy in the courts-the
NAACP.1 80 Professor Bell contends that the NAACP has pushed for
integrated schools through class actions against the wishes of class
members who would prefer to concentrate primarily on improving
local school quality. He thus calls for courts to "apply carefully the
standard tests for determining the validity of class action allegations
and the standard procedures for protecting the interests of unnamed
class members."' 81 He does not demand refusal to certify or decertifi-
cation of all classes in the face of dissent, but the forcefulness of his
critique suggests the need for elaboration of the argument favoring def-
erence to organizations like the NAACP.
The NAACP does not necessarily represent the perceived interests
of the parents and children who are members of a class. It thus lacks
the perfect accountability of an organization litigating for its own mem-
bership only. However, the NAACP and similar public interest organi-
zations have distinct advantages over legal rights entities composed, for
example, solely of a private lawyer and a nominal client. Organiza-
tions like the NAACP are subject to much more scrutiny than a private
lawyer acting on behalf of an individual. The NAACP, for example,
represents a large group of people who are deeply involved in the issue
of school desegregation. The organization must justify its strategic
choices to the group that its actions are intended to benefit. If enough
members of the group disagree with the organization's choices-to
favor widespread busing, for example-those members will reassess or
even withdraw their support.
As previously suggested, therefore, courts should inquire into
whether a class action brought by an organization is the product of a
decisionmaking process that guarantees some accountability to the or-
ganization's membership. 18 2 Rule 23.2 explicitly gives courts the power
to make this inquiry in lawsuits brought by unincorporated associa-
tions, presumably to prevent easy circumvention of the requirements of
Rule 23. The same kind of inquiry can be undertaken for incorporated
associations such as the NAACP. Unless representativeness is demon-
strated, courts should not permit expansion of the lawsuit beyond the
specific individuals who initiated it.
Characteristics of the class.-Next, the court should explore the
Commission's proposed revisions to the Code of Professional Responsibility. MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDuCT Rule 7.3 (Proposed Final Draft, May 30, 1981).
180 See Bell, supra note 10.
-181 Id. at 508.
182 See supra notes 40 & 41 and accompanying text.
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general characteristics of the class, again with a view to ensuring maxi-
mum accountability consistent with the purpose of class actions-that
purpose being the aggregation of claims that might not be presented
otherwise. Particularly if the class is small and centralized-thus al-
lowing members to be contacted and mobilized into an active organiza-
tion fairly easily-the court should pay close attention to evidence of
conflict and dissent. In this situation, the court should expect the class
representatives and their lawyers to take the initiative in responding to
class opposition. If the court finds that the class lawyers and represent-
atives are sensitive enough to class dissent that the class takes on the
traits of an organization, the court should find that the class representa-
tives are adequate.
On the other hand, if the class is large and diffuse, making it diffi-
cult and expensive even to communicate with class members, much less
to transform the class into an entity resembling an ongoing organiza-
tion, 183 the court should be less concerned with evidence of conflict and
dissent. As Professor Stewart suggests, "the efforts that would be in-
volved in identifying the individual preferences of class members
would reintroduce many of the crippling transaction costs which public
interest representation is designed to circumvent."' 184 In order to en-
courage these actions, therefore, the court should expect class repre-
sentatives and their lawyers to be less sensitive to class opposition.
Nonetheless, not all large and diffuse classes should be certified on the
assumption that they cannot be organized. 185
Impact of the action and the proposed remedy on the class.-The
third factor the court should assess, and the one most often treated in
the legal literature, 186 is the impact of the action on the class. Impact
can be discussed according to whether the remedy sought is "one-shot"
or "structural". 18 7 The one-shot remedy is self-explanatory. Examples
include an injunction prohibiting enforcement of an unconstitutional
law or practice, such as CIA surveillance of mail' 88 or a university's
policy against communist speakers on campus.' 89 The one-shot rem-
183 Other commentators who have recognized the desirability of organizational advocacy have
rendered a similar conclusion. See, e.g., Brilmayer, supra note 41 (discussing case and contro-
versy requirements and standing requirements); Trubek, PublicAdvocacy: Administrative Govern-
ment and the Representation af Diffuse Interests, in AccEss TO JUSTICE: EMERGING ISSUES AND
PERSPECTIVES 445 (M. Cappelletti & B. Garth eds. 1979) (volume three of the Florence Access-to-
Justice Project series) (discussing the institution of "public advocate").
184 Stewart, The Reformation of.American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1766-67
(1975).
185 See infra text accompanying notes 197-200.
186 See, e.g., COLUMBIA Special Project, supra note 20, at 899-901; HARVARD Study, supra note
20, at 149-93.
187 The term "structural" is borrowed from Fiss, supra note 20.
188 See Driver v. Helms, 74 F.R.D. 382 (D.R.I. 1977).
189 See Snyder v. Board of Trustees, 286 F. Supp. 927 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
77:492 (1982)
edy may also consist of a rule of disclosure, a due process hearing, or
even an award of damages, all of which the court may implement with
a simple decree or judgment. 190
In contrast, the structural remedy, which frequently requires the
court to choose among many possible means of redressing a particular
wrong, involves institutional reform. 191 Consequently, this remedy
necessitates more court participation than the one-shot remedy. The
successful antidiscrimination action, for example, does not result in a
simple order not to discriminate; rather, it results in a plan to root out
discrimination. Similarly, suits against schools, prisons, and mental
hospitals often result in massive institutional changes.
Structural remedy cases which, unlike one-shot remedy cases, ne-
cessitate substantial court involvement, 192 require the use of such de-
vices as subclasses, redefined classes, and intervention--either
permitted or invited. Accordingly, to the extent that these devices al-
low the court to channel conflict and dissent into a representational
framework that gives the court an accurate picture of the class, the
court need not deny class certification. A denial may even prevent the
court from ascertaining the information revelant to the informed exer-
cise of equitable discretion.
In addition to subclassing, redefining classes, and allowing inter-
vention, the court must consider the precise effect of the proposed de-
cree on the class. To the extent that the decree might impose
substantial costs in addition to conferring benefits, the court should
give dissent greater weight.
Combining the Factors: Certifying or Refusing to Certify the Class
The preceding section began by stating that courts should be re-
quired to seek out and evaluate the nature and scope of class dissent.
Next, it defined three factors relevant to the decision whether to certify
the class. Courts should prefer certification, but not automatically
grant it, when an accountable legal rights entity represents the class, the
class is too diffuse to enforce its rights by any other means, or the court
can manage dissent through such mechanisms as subclassing, redefin-
ing the class, permitting intervention, and structuring the remedy. This
analysis applies primarily to injunction actions brought under Rule
23(b)(2). As a practical matter, in damages actions brought under Rule
23(b)(3), in which a dissenting member may opt out, it is unlikely that a
190 See, e.g., Swain v. Brinegar, 517 F.2d 766 (7th Cir. 1975); Nolop v. Volpe, 333 F. Supp.
1364 (D.S.D. 1971).
191 See, ag, Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979) (en
banc), rev'd on other grounds, 451 U.S. 1 (1981); Glover v. Johnson, 85 F.R.D. I (E.D. Mich.
1977).
192 See, e.g., COLUMBIA Special Project, supra note 20, at 877-901. See also supra notes 130-41
and accompanying text.
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court will refuse to certify or will decertify the class. This section ex-
plains how these factors specifically relate to the "substantial conflict"
test.193 Opposition is substantial when the concern with accountability
under the circumstances is sufficient to outweigh the interest in law en-
forcement through the class action.
The easy case for denial occurs when opposition to the action is so
great that, in effect, no "class" of individuals supports the aims of class
representatives and their lawyers. Bailey v. Ryan Stevedoring, Inc. 194
exemplifies this degree of opposition. The court denied class status in
Bailey because 204 of 230 class members repudiated the class represen-
tative. Similarly, in Davis v. Roadway Express, Inc. ,195 seventeen of
twenty-three class members did not wish to be represented in an anti-
discrimination class action. The court in Davis explained its denial of
certification on the grounds of both opposition to the lawsuit and lack
of numerosity.196 The latter reason technically did not apply, however,
since the seventeen could not opt out under Rule 23.
Cases like Bailey and Davis require no real sensitivity to the other
factors identified here. Where class opposition is not so overwhelming,
however, courts must apply considerable discretion. The following ex-
amples will illustrate the kind of close attention that courts should pay
to class dissent.
The first example involves a class action to enjoin construction of a
dam that would cut off recreational opportunities in a river. The action
is brought on behalf of all those who would engage in recreational ac-
tivities on the river-a group difficult to identify but presumably num-
bering in the thousands. That group would include individuals who
live near the river and who expect their communities to develop and
prosper with the additional electrical power which the dam would
make available. Those individuals would prefer that the action not
proceed at all or, at least, that it not proceed on their behalf.197
Assuming that the court is able to ascertain class attitudes, it
should take class dissent into account.198 If the dissent is apparent but
not overwhelming, the court should balance it with the other factors
193 See supra text accompanying note 169.
194 528 F.2d 551 (5th Cir. 1976). See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
195 590 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1979), af'don rehearing, 621 F.2d 775 (1980). See supra notes 86-89
and accompanying text.
196 590 F.2d at 144.
197 Sometimes the court may not have enough information to identify class preferences even as
generally as they have been identified in this example. Obviously, the court then only can enforce
the general requirements of Rule 23.
198 Methods of ensuring adequate representation of the attitudes of all class members include
the following: requiring notice to ibsent members, see supra notes 119-29 and accompanying text,
and permitting intervention by class members, see supra notes 147-50 and accompanying text. See
also COLUMBIA Special Project, supra note 20, at 878-83.
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that have been outlined previously.1 99 Militating against certification is
the fact that since the lawsuit, if successful, will prevent the dam from
being built-the injunction is an absolute remedy-it will have a fairly
serious long-term impact on dissenters. Furthermore, the class lawyer
and named plaintiff have no particular claim to legitimacy as legal
rights enforcers. Arguing in favor of certification is the presumed diffi-
culty of organizing and communicating with the members of a class
this large and diffuse. The question is whether such difficulty out-
weighs the evidence of strongly felt and legitimate dissent.
If evidence shows "substantial" dissent-that is, more than a
majority of the class members oppose the class action-the court
should deny certification. To the extent that the class action provides
some advantage in obtaining the injunction, the court should not grant
that advantage. The interest in law enforcement in this case is not suffi-
cient in itself to dictate class certification, and the remedy cannot be
shaped to account for the views and perceived interests of class dissent-
ers. In addition, no reason exists to favor the particular lawyer and
representative as a law enforcement entity. The diffuseness of the class
is not a sufficient reason here to approve the class.200 Individuals or ad
hoc organizations could certainly bring suit and seek the same remedy.
Thus, by denying the class, the court is not denying anyone's rights.
Furthermore, the court is recognizing dissenters' views by not forcing
them to be a part of the litigation.
Moreover, as will be emphasized below, 201 the certification deci-
sion may not be crucial in any event. Whether or not the court certifies
the class in the situation just described, by seeking out class dissent the
court will obtain a full picture of the constituency whose interests the
lawsuit will affect. That picture may influence whether the court grants
a remedy as extreme as an injunction if the plaintiffs prove a violation
of the substantive law. Consequently, while the certification decision
itself is significant, its importance should not be exaggerated.
A sex discrimination injunction action brought on behalf of all fe-
male employees of a business organization provides a second example.
Again, the lawyer and named plaintiffs have no special status as a legal
rights entity. The class numbers several hundred and some significant,
but not overwhelming, percentage of the members indicate through
199 See supra notes 174-92 and accompanying text.
200 The relator action provides an interesting middle ground between private and public suits
on behalf of diffuse interests. In relator actions, the private attorney general obtains permission to
sue "on the relation of' the public attorney general. See generally Cappelletti, supra note 20. It is
significant that the Justice Department's proposed revisions of the class action damage sections of
Rule 23, which emphasize the law enforcement or deterrent role of class actions brought for a
large number of individual small claimants, relied in great part on the relator idea. See, eg.,
Berry, Ending Substance's Indenture to Procedure: The Imperative for Comprehensive Revision of
the Class Damage Action, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 229, 326-34 (1980).
201 See infra note 209 and accompanying text.
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credible evidence that they do not believe they are victims of discrimi-
nation and that they are content with their current positions. Even
though the class is relatively small and easy to organize, and no partic-
ular legitimacy attaches to the parties and their attorneys, this suit
should proceed as a class action for two reasons. First, the plaintiffs
seek a structural rather than a one-shot remedy, and thus the court can
consider the interests of dissenters in shaping the remedy. Second, the
court can shape the remedy so as not to harm the women who are con-
tent with the status quo. Those women need not apply for promotions
and presumably will not object to raises. Thus, the effect will be the
same as if they were able to opt out. In similar situations, the court
should not deny class status if there is more than majority, but not
overwhelming, class opposition.
As a final example, consider school desegregation litigation
brought on behalf of all black children in a particular school system.
This discussion will treat two possible suits: one in which the plaintiffs
are represented by the NAACP (or the Legal Defense Fund), and one
in which the plaintiffs are represented by an independent private law-
yer. The litigants in both suits seek a decree that would involve consid-
erable busing from neighborhood schools to integrate the school
system. As in the previous example, the remedy sought is structural
and, therefore, can be shaped to some extent to accommodate the con-
cerns of parents who oppose busing. The class here is not diffuse; its
members are easily identifiable and can be reached without great diffi-
culty. The major difference between this action and the sex discrimina-
tion action is that this remedy will not, in practice, be voluntary. The
children of parents opposed to busing will probably be bused, and that
is a substantial cost to impose. Under these facts, the court should deny
certification if a documented majority opposes the suit brought by the
private attorney.202
Once again, the private attorney can proceed with the action on
behalf of individuals or an organization created by busing proponents
for litigation purposes, but there is no reason why the pro-busing liti-
gants should enjoy the law enforcement advantages that attend class
certification.20 3 Those individuals, after all, form merely one private
faction among many. If they are successful, opposing factions will suf-
fer heavy burdens.
If the NAACP institutes the litigation, however, the balance
should tip in favor of certification in a close case. An established, bona
fide interest group responsive to a broad constituency that is interested
in the issues raised by the lawsuit has a strong claim to the advantages
202 In some instances, the court may consider other factors, such as the problem of mootness,
that may make class status essential even to get the case into court. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S.
393, 397-403 (1975).
203 See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
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that come with class certification. 20 4 The NAACP does not represent
one faction among many; rather, it is an organization with some degree
of accountability and sanctions to enforce the legal rights of the constit-
uency that supports it. Some class members may disagree with the ap-
proach the NAACP takes to school desegregation litigation, but there is
no danger that the NAACP will decide to litigate based on a desire for
pecuniary gain, personal ambitions, or the ideological aims of a lawyer
and client isolated from the constituency that the action is supposed to
benefit. The court, therefore, should err in the direction of class certifi-
cation and law enforcement in situations similar to this.
These examples illustrate the kind of analysis that the court should
undertake in determining whether to certify a class. The purpose here,
however, is to suggest how the court should address and weigh the key
factors, not to develop a simple test. The results of seemingly inconsis-
tent cases such as East Texas Motor Freight20 5 and Elliot v. Sperry
.Rand,206 perhaps can be rationalized within this type of analysis.20 7 It
is essential that the court apply the appropriate analysis and weigh the
various factors before concluding that there is or is not "substantial
conflict going to the subject matter of the lawsuit. ' 20 8 At present, un-
fortunately, the substantial conflict test is merely an invitation for the
court to reach an unprincipled decision.
Discretionary Orders in Class Actions
The purpose of this Article is not limited to finding a way for
courts to approach the class certification decision. It also encourages
courts to search for class conflict and dissent in order to gain an accu-
rate picture of the interests and desires of class members. Indeed, the
certification decision itself matters less if the class construct is not used
as a device to conceal full information about class members from the
court. Certification provides certain advantages in injunction actions,
but it is not a prerequisite to bringing suit or to securing the remedy.209
In addition, the inquiry that the court undertakes for certification will
provide information which helps it decide other discretionary orders in
class action litigation and in other actions for injunctions.
204 Other forms of accountability, such as a decisionmaking process within the organization,
may substitute for a broad organizational constituency. See supra text accompanying note 182.
205 See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
206 See supra notes 105-12 and accompanying text.
207 It might be, for example, that in East Texas Motor Freight the trial court's only realistic
choice was either to eliminate the no-transfer rule, see supra note 82, or to allow it, especially
given that class certification was sought after the trial on the merits. It appears that in Elliot the
court could have structured any decree to account for women who did not wish to claim that they
had been discriminated against in employment.
208 See supra note 73 and accompanying text. See also supra text accompanying note 169.
209 For example, despite a refusal to certify the class, the court still issued an injunction in
Bailey v. Ryan Stevedoring, 528 F.2d at 551.
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The goal, moreover, is not just to ensure that the court hears all
legal positions within the class, but also that the court has a complete
understanding of the class members' responses to those positions, in-
cluding the position favoring nonenforcement of rights. It may some-
times be useful for the court to hold elections, either indirectly through
notice provisions or, in smaller class actions, through a real "town
meeting." Near the end of a lengthy sex and race discrimination action
against the San Francisco police force, for example, a federal magis-
trate conducted a courtroom election to decide how many class mem-
bers thought their interests would best be protected by Officers for
Justice, the original plaintiffs' group, and how many preferred the Po-
lice Officers' Association, which had intervened originally on the de-
fendants' side.210 While not strictly relevant to the legal arguments in
the case, the class members' preferences did influence how the court
exercised its discretion. A court may resolve a lawsuit in any number
of ways, and one remedy is not necessarily more correct than another.
In formulating a remedy, however, the court must consider not only the
requirements of the law, but also the views and interests of class
members.21'
It is certainly possible for a court to tailor a remedy to the particu-
lar characteristics and interests of class members or intervenors.212 If a
central problem in class action litigation is, as Professors Kirp and Bab-
cock recently observed, that "particular points of view are predictably
and systematically undervalued," 21 3 the analysis suggested here can
help to overcome this deficiency. Professor Fiss, in his studies of in-
junctions, has emphasized that the court possesses considerable discre-
tion in devising a remedy.214 This Article encourages courts to add
information to that discretion.
210 The final settlement is reported in Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 473 F. Supp.
801 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
211 For discussion of how the court uses its discretion in framing a remedy, see Diver, The
Judge as Political Powerbroker: Superintending Structural Change in Public Institutions, 65 VA. L.
Rav. 43 (1979); Starr, 4ccommodation andAccountabiliyw 4 Strategyfor Judicial Enforcement of
Institutional Reform Decrees, 32 ALA. L. Rav. 399 (1980); COLUMBIA Special Project, supra note
20, at 790-813.
212 See, e.g., United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1974), modjed sub
nom. Reserve Mining Co. v. Lord, 529 F.2d 181 (8th Cir. 1976) (in order to protect the jobs of
union members the union intervened in an action and prevented the closing of a polluting plant);
Evans v. Buchanan, 416 F. Supp. 328 (D. Del. 1976) (see supra text accompanying notes 135-37).
213 See Kirp & Babcbck, supra note 10, at 392.
214 See general 0. Fiss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION (1978). Indeed, Fiss suggests that
the choice before the court is not simply which remedy, but whether there be any remedy,
even assuming a substantive right was violated. The injunction may be the only remedy
available, or it may be vastly superior to any other, and yet there may be good reasons not to
grant it.
Id. at 171. A similar theme is developed in Parker & Stone, supra note 25. See also J. VINING,
LEGAL IDENTITY 171 (1978) (justice in certain circumstances may be conceived "as something
more than legality").
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THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CLASS ACTIONS AND THE PROBLEM OF
CLASS INDIFFERENCE
This Article has focused on class conflict and dissent, not on class
indifference, which is closely related and probably more pervasive.
Class actions frequently are brought on behalf of individuals who sim-
ply do not care whether their legal rights are enforced. The class attor-
ney who is motivated by ideology or a desire for attorneys' fees may be
the individual most interested in a particular lawsuit. Such a case
presents both the problem of accountability and the problem of
effectiveness.
Accountability is not a serious problem when class members are
indifferent rather than opposed to the action. When class members are
indifferent, the action at least does not proceed against their wishes and
perceived interests. 215 The question, then, is whether the court should
nevertheless deny class status if it discerns widespread class indiffer-
ence. I suggest that it should not. The law enforcement interest em-
bodied in Rule 23 is great enough to overcome indifference. 216 No
representative institution can fulfill its responsibilities unless it can act
despite a passive membership.
Effectiveness is a problem which, although not raised before, has
important general implications here. Empirical research makes clear
that class action "victories" can become long-term defeats217 if no one
monitors the decision to enforce rights and ensures compliance with
both the spirit and the letter of the decision. 218 Effective monitoring
requires the presence of an active organization interested in the task, or
at least a group of sufficiently motivated individuals.219 A class of dis-
senters or even an indifferent class may fail to monitor, and the litiga-
tion victory then may turn out to be hollow. 220
215 The concern here goes to the whole phenomenon of public interest law and private attor-
neys general. See, eg., HARvARD Developments, supra note 22, at 1457-61. See generally Bellow
& Kettleson, supra note 24. Given that my proposal will result in the discovery of latent class
conflict, the likelihood of an indifferent class will in any event be reduced.
216 See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text. See also Yeazell, Part II, supra note 1, at
1115-20.
217 See, e-g., sources cited supra notes 31 & 160. See also Brill, The Use andAbuses of Legal
AssIstance, 31 THE PUB. INTEREST 38 (1973).
218 Monitoring requires "persistent followup and constant surveillance." R. MARSHALL, C.
KNAPP, M. LIGGETr & R. GLOVER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES 144 (1978) [hereinafter cited as EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION]. See
also J. HANDLER, supra note 160, at 208 ("[t]he importance of building on permanent technical
and professional resources to make participation effective is so obvious, yet it seems so often ne-
glected by law reformers and social reform groups").
219 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, supra note 218, at 150 ("change in minority employment
pattern is more likely when the minorities themselves are organized to bring pressure for change
and when litigation is accompanied by an outreach effort to recruit, train, and place qualified
minorities").
220 Attorneys tend to rely on reports prepared by the defendants to monitor results: "Most
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Without entirely resolving the practical problem raised by class
indifference, 221 it is evident that the system suggested in this Article for
discovering and coping with class dissent and conflict will reduce the
likelihood of lawyers' class actions on behalf of purely abstract and
indifferent classes. Knowing that the court will probe the class for dis-
sent, the class lawyer and representatives will try to minimize dissent
by informing class members of the lawsuit's advantages. This effort
should minimize class indifference by involving class members in the
lawsuit. In short, once class attorneys learn that the court will treat the
class as more than a merely formal entity, they will try to obtain class
members' support, and this should make class action litigation both
more accountable and more effective.
A FURTHER PROBLEM OF LEGITIMACY: COURTS AND PARTICIPATION
A lengthy debate has taken place about the legitimacy of litigation
that forces judges to make apparently political and administrative deci-
sions involving injunctions-that is, decisions based not on neutral le-
gal principles, but on political and instrumental considerations. 222 This
debate over "public law, '223 "polycentric," 224 or "structural reform 225
litigation has been based on differing perceptions as to the litigation's
novelty, its appropriateness, and its effectiveness. I have argued in this
Article that the purpose of Rule 23 and the existing law enforcement
role of class actions leads to an even more participatory view of class
litigation than has generally been thought necessary. In order to
achieve the basic goal of efficient law enforcement with accountability,
either to class members or to any other relevant constituency, courts
must pay greater attention to conflict and dissent in the class. This
view expands the town meeting metaphor from one where only legal
arguments are important to one where constituencies participate and
debate on both political and legal grounds. I even have suggested that
elections have a place in this modern litigation.226
attorneys admit that these reports are not a satisfactory monitoring mechanism but that neither
they nor the clients have the resources (and, in the case of the attorneys, the interest) to pursue the
matter further." J. HANDLER, supra note 160, at 148.
221 The general problem of enforcement of rights possessed by disadvantaged groups must ulti-
mately be related to questions of political and economic power. See, e.g., Cappelletti & Garth,
Foreword- Access to Justice as a Focus of Research, 1 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. ix, xvi-xxii
(1981).
222 Compare, e.g., D. HoROWiTZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY (1977); Aldisert, The Role
of the Courts in Contemporary Society, 38 U. PITT. L. REv. 437 (1977); Fuller, The Forms and
Limits ofAdjudication, 92 HARV. L. REv. 353, 394-95 (1978); and Nagel, Separation ofPowers and
the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REV. 661 (1978) with Cavanagh & Sarat,
supra note 141, and sources cited supra note 20.
223 See generally Chayes, supra note 20.
224 See generally Fuller, supra note 222.
225 See generally Fiss, supra note 20.
226 See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
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It might be argued that this kind of litigation is inconsistent with
the accepted view of what courts can and cannot do. In fact, this analy-
sis might be seen to carry illegitimacy of the courts a step further than it
has been carried before. The traditional views of judicial legitimacy,
however, may not serve us well in evaluating structural reform litiga-
tion. Certainly, as Kirp and Babcock state in a recent contribution to
this debate: "Institutional reform cases force the judiciary to relate
constitutional values to particulars of the cases and to test the degree to
which it can effectively adapt itself to the task of reform without be-
coming merely a political institution. ' 227 It is indeed becoming in-
creasingly more difficult to argue that the judiciary is not a political
institution, but the current debate fails to explain precisely how this
affects the "legitimacy" of the courts.
Scholarship about the legitimacy of the courts tends to revolve
around the nineteenth century ideal of impartial judges, neutral legal
principles, and judicial decisions determining that one party is right
and another wrong.228 Scholars such as Professor Martin Shapiro re-
cently have shown, however, that this ideal probably has never been
realized in any country.229 Courts always have been involved in a vari-
ety of functions, including mediation and negotiation, social control on
behalf of the state, and administration. The amount of time courts
devote to each of these functions may be distributed differently now
than in the past, but courts always have been "political" institutions.230
We can thus take one of two approaches to the question of legitimacy:
we can seek to move more towards the nineteenth century ideal, or we
can develop criteria for legitimacy consistent with what courts really
do. While I favor the latter approach, acceptance of the analysis
presented here requires only one step in that direction. This discussion
shows how courts can make class action litigation both more accounta-
ble and more effective in enforcing the law. Regardless of whether the
modem class action corresponds to an ideal, this proposal can at least
improve the institution we have.
227 See Kirp & Babcock, supra note 10, at 397.
228 See, e.g., R. UNGDER, supra note 23, at 176-223 (describing the development and decline of
legal formalism in procedural and substantive law); M. WEBER, LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY
227-28 (Rheinstein ed. 1954) (describing "judicial formalism").
229 See M. SHAPIRO, CouRTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS (1981).
230 Id at 63 ("[l]ike most other major political institutions, courts tend to be loaded with multi-
ple political functions, ranging under various circumstances from bolstering the legitimacy of the
political regime to allocating scarce economic resources or setting major social policies").
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